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Executive Summary
Switzerland’s central role in commodity trading brings with it leverage and responsibilities. The Swiss com-
modity trading industry and its regulatory environment have come under increasing scrutiny as a possible 
conduit for illicit financial flows (IFFs) out of resource-rich developing countries. Key revelations from the so-
called Paradise Papers point to the involvement of Swiss-based firms and agents in opaque transactions and 
potentially corrupt commodity deals. The leaked documents have once again called attention to Switzerland 
and its responsibility to enhance transparency in commodity trading. Against this background, Switzerland 
has committed to improving tax and trade transparency and curbing commodity trade-related IFFs. A spe-
cific dimension concerns illicit flows associated with false invoicing and manipulative transfer pricing. The 
broad underlying issue is one of aggressive tax avoidance, if not outright tax evasion, often entangled with 
money laundering and corruption. 
This working paper aims to contribute to the analysis of policy responses to tackle commodity trade-related 
illicit financial flows by looking at the role of tax transparency in helping uncover mispricing practices. 
The report addresses this issue with reference to Switzerland’s legal framework and practices regarding 
exchange of information (EOI) between tax authorities. Commodity trade mispricing is used as an umbrella 
definition that encompasses both trade misinvoicing and transfer mispricing. Trade misinvoicing covers the 
fraudulent mispricing of goods; it involves exporters and/or importers deliberately misstating the value, 
quantity, or nature of goods or services in a cross-border trade transaction. Transfer mispricing (also known 
as abusive transfer pricing or transfer price manipulation) refers to the manipulation of transfer prices 
within a multinational firm in order to avoid taxes on profits in particular jurisdictions.
Exchange of tax information can shed light on the mechanisms of value manipulation in cross-border 
transactions. The assessment of trade-mispricing practices is a fact-intensive exercise that rests on transac-
tion-level data. To detect trade misinvoicing, customs and tax administrations must determine the correct 
description, quantity, quality, grade, and specification of an exported commodity, and the truth or accuracy 
of the declared customs value for given exported goods. As regards transfer mispricing, under the “ca-
nonical” transaction transfer-pricing methods, transfer-pricing risk assessment and audits require data on 
comparable “uncontrolled” transactions, operating costs, and profit margins. Exchange on request, spon-
taneous exchange of tax rulings and exchange of country-by-country (CbC) reports can in principle provide 
tax administrations with focused and useful information to perform this analysis. The automatic exchange 
of financial account information is not directly relevant, but remains a key tool for detecting undeclared 
offshore wealth where the proceeds from mispricing can end up.
Yet a host of procedural rules and principles limit the use of exchange-of-information mechanisms for in-
vestigating commodity trade mispricing. Among the many hurdles, the information exchanged may only be 
used for the purpose for which it is intended in the exchange agreement, which is often confined to the 
assessment of income and capital taxes, not customs duties; stringent rules constrain the flow of informa-
tion between tax, customs, and other administrative units, which inhibits data matching of tax and customs 
records; the request letter addressed to Switzerland should specifically identify the taxpayer or group of 
taxpayers under investigation, a challenging requirement when investigating opaque business transactions; 
the request can be declined on grounds that the requesting state could obtain the information in its own 
jurisdiction, given the assumed symmetry between sell and purchase documents in cross-border transac-
tions; and taxpayer’s procedural rights – to be notified, to inspect the record, and to appeal – may effectively 
delay or deter the exchange of information. As regards the exchange of country-by-country reports, they 
cannot be used to make automatic adjustments to taxpayer’s income on the basis of an allocation formula, 
under the existing standard; nor do they contain detailed transaction-level data. Altogether, these condi-
tions limit the operational significance of tax information exchange procedures in uncovering commodity 
trade mispricing.
The challenge is compounded by stringent prerequisites that limit the participation of developing coun-
tries in exchange procedures. Switzerland exchanges tax information on a reciprocal basis, which means 
that Switzerland’s exchange partners need to have in place adequate laws and regulations in relation to 
the availability of information, the gathering of information, and the transmission of the information. In 
addition – and independent of reciprocity – adequate laws, operational procedures, and IT solutions must 
be in place in the receiving country to protect confidentiality of tax information. To qualify as a potential 
exchange partner, a country must undergo a preliminary confidentiality and data safeguard assessment 
Executive Summary
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at both the legal and operational level. These requirements pose significant compliance hurdles for many 
developing countries. As a result, less-developed countries are typically excluded from the exchange of tax 
information. The Swiss exchange-of-information network is clearly shewed towards higher-income coun-
tries: as of October 2018, Switzerland had a legal basis to exchange tax information on request with only 
two low-income countries and 13 lower-income countries (compared to 97 high- and upper-middle-income 
countries); low-income countries are completely absent from Switzerland’s automatic exchange of informa-
tion network. 
Finally, questions remain as to the ability of countries to use the information exchanged. In particular, if the 
automatic exchange were activated, a country would only benefit from the exchange if it had the technical 
capacity to decrypt and process bulk data and match the decoded data against tax returns declared in the 
country. 
How, then, can countries mitigate or overcome these obstacles? There is some room to move forward, 
pragmatically, through minor changes in administrative practices and the law. We call for a four-pronged 
approach to improve the effectiveness of exchange mechanisms for tackling commodity trade-related IFFs: 
(1) more flexibility to use tax information for tracking down trade mispricing; (2) a pragmatic, targeted 
relaxation of procedural requirements; (3) the establishment of a legal basis to exchange information with 
lower-income countries; and (4) a transactional, phased-in approach to enhance administrative capacity in 
poor countries via peer-to-peer knowledge transfer that pools expertise from different institutional stake-
holders in Switzerland. 
First, Switzerland and its exchange partners could consider adjusting exchange-of-information rules and 
practices to allow for a broader use of tax information in relation to commodity trade mispricing. For ex-
ample, Switzerland could proactively favour the flow of information between tax and customs units in the 
receiving country, by generally endorsing this practice when sending information. This would ease external 
obstacles to the cross-matching of tax and customs data in the receiving country, a far-reaching technique 
to track down customs fraud. Furthermore, as part of a concerted international initiative, Switzerland could 
use the data generated by exchange procedures for measurement and reporting purposes on Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 16 dealing with IFFs, and set up internal exchange protocols for the flow of in-
formation between the AEOI team and economic departments. Finally, when the CbC reporting standard 
is reviewed in 2020, it is worth considering some flexibility to allow capacity-constrained countries to use 
income allocation formulas based on the CbC reporting data. In parallel or as an alternative, the CbC re-
porting template could be amended to include detailed transaction-level data that enable tax authorities to 
perform in-depth transfer pricing analysis.
Second, Switzerland could possibly ease some procedural requirements that limit the use of EOI mecha-
nisms for tracking down commodity trade mispricing. There is flexibility to move forward, pragmatically, 
through minor changes to administrative practices in a number of respects. For example, the lifting of the 
reciprocity requirement would open the possibility to exchange information with countries that do not have 
the administrative capacity to gather and transmit information on their side. The key challenge is to relax 
the requirement without upsetting the balance that the Swiss legislature has sought between competing 
interests. In order words, the balance can be pushed further to accommodate transparency concerns, but 
it cannot be tilted too far away from concerns about taxpayer rights or regarding fair allocation of respon-
sibilities and costs between requesting and supplying jurisdictions. A targeted loosening of the reciprocity 
requirement would respect this balance. Switzerland could lift reciprocity requirements with a few select 
low-income countries during a transitional, phase-in period only, or possibly on a trial basis in the context 
of technical-assistance projects regarding information mechanisms. Such non-reciprocal exchange could still 
require developing countries to have adequate safeguards in place to ensure confidentially and data pro-
tection. In this respect, a relaxation of reciprocity would not imply any erosion of taxpayers’ privacy rights. 
Note that Switzerland already supplies information on a de facto non-reciprocal basis, as the information 
requests met by Switzerland far exceed the requests it submits to other countries. 
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Third, Switzerland could deepen its technical cooperation in this area by volunteering and testing pioneer-
ing EOI practices as a partner in pilot projects. The focus here would be on peer-to-peer, transactional 
knowledge transfer, including by temporarily loaning out staff to tax administrations in developing coun-
tries. The approach could be modular and phased-in: it would aim at creation of medium-term, preparatory, 
and transitional arrangements that might eventually lead to full-fledged EOI mechanisms. In Switzerland, 
this would involve strengthened interactions and coordination between the Federal Tax Administration, 
the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the State Secretariat for International Financial Matters, and the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
Finally, in order to create a legal basis to exchange information with low-income countries, Switzerland 
could reconsider the “unilateral route” to the exchange, whereby exchange would be based on a domestic 
law provision “operationalized” by Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) rather than bilateral exchange 
treaties. This already occurs in other areas of administrative assistance. A domestic law provision may pro-
vide a legal basis to exchange information with poor countries on a trial basis in the medium term, in the 
context of pilot technical-assistance projects aimed at establishing a foundation for full-fledged exchange 
of information. Operationalized by ad hoc MoU, the domestic provision could enable a tailormade approach 
to implementation that goes beyond the “one size fits all” solutions of existing treaty-based EOI standards.
Still, questions remain as to the cost-effectiveness – and opportunity costs – of exchange of information 
as a mechanism for countering commodity trade-related IFFs. Exchange of information in tax matters is a 
complex, indirect tool to tackle commodity trade mispricing, and one that relies heavily on administrative 
capacity and discretion. It is also a costly endeavour, particularly in terms of the investment needed to set 
up the needed EOI infrastructure in countries that face structural gaps and hurdles. On the one hand, these 
interventions may yield lasting results and act as a catalyst or an entry point for far-reaching, incremental 
reform of the tax system in poor countries – especially if implemented in concert with domestic resource 
mobilization efforts. On the other, they may be short-lived and doomed to fail, similar to other cases of legal 
“transplantation”. Indeed, costly efforts to set up legal, operational, and IT infrastructures do not necessar-
ily translate into sustained capacity to operate the supplied infrastructure or to use the information shared. 
Alternative policy options to track down mispricing deserve objective, critical scrutiny. Alternative measures 
and tools specifically geared to counter value manipulation in cross-border transactions should be consid-
ered, including “off-track” solutions that could deescalate international tax competition and cut incentives 
to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Further research is needed in this regard.
Executive Summary
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Research Question: Tax Transparency and Commodity Trade Mispricing
Research Question: Tax Transparency and Commodity Trade 
Mispricing 
In recent years, there has been an accelerating push to expand transparency and exchange of information 
(EOI) for tax purposes, in an effort to curb cross-border tax evasion and avoidance. Since 2014, more than 
100 jurisdictions have committed to the automatic exchange of offshore bank account information, with 
over 3,200 bilateral exchange relationships established as of August 2018 (OECD 2018e and 2018f).1 Over 
150 jurisdictions have pledged to exchange tax information on request “to the widest possible extent”, 
in line with the OECD-sponsored Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Pur-
poses international standard, with 99 jurisdictions assessed “compliant” or “largely compliant” against 
the standard as of July 2018 (OECD 2018c).2 Around 60 jurisdictions have established the domestic legal 
framework for multinational enterprise (MNEs) CbC reporting, with over 1,400 exchange relationships ac-
tively ongoing in 2017 (OECD 2018b).3 Finally, more than 11,000 tax rulings are currently being exchanged 
(OECD 2018b).4 Overall, exchange of information in tax matters has reached unprecedented levels, with 
breakthroughs on multiple fronts – e.g. regarding exchange of information on request, automatic exchange 
of financial account information, exchange of CbC reports, and spontaneous exchange of tax rulings.
To date, the likely role of these transparency frameworks in curbing commodity trade-related illicit financial 
flows (IFFs) has not been fully explored. Do these exchange frameworks provide a viable mechanism for de-
tecting commodity trade mispricing? In particular, can tax authorities in resource-rich developing countries 
rely on exchange of information instruments for the purpose of detecting and ascertaining facts in relation 
to commodity trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing? If there are limits to this use, can procedural 
requirements be eased and administrative practices adjusted to allow the use of EOI mechanisms for the 
purpose of improving transparency in commodity trading?
Box 1: Commodity trade mispricing, trade misinvoicing, and transfer mispricing
Several of the terms used in this report require definition.
Illicit financial flows refer to capital or money that is earned, transferred, or used in contravention of domestic and inter-
national laws and standards. In this report, the term “commodity trade-related IFFs” is narrowly used to denote mispricing 
in commodity-trade transactions. 
Commodity trade mispricing is used as an umbrella term that encompasses both trade misinvoicing (or false invoicing) and 
transfer mispricing (or abusive transfer pricing). 
Trade misinvoicing refers to the fraudulent mispricing of goods – for example, to avoid taxes, circumvent exchange con-
trols, or launder money. It involves exporters and/or importers deliberately misstating the value, quantity, or nature of goods 
or services in a cross-border trade transaction. It may entail under-invoicing, when an invoice states a price as a lower value 
than is actually paid, or over-invoicing, when the declared price is higher than what was actually paid. This can be accom-
plished through various means, including false invoicing, double invoicing, and third invoicing; mis-description of quantity, 
quality, or grade of the traded goods; manipulation of freight and insurance charges; non-declaration of other dutiable 
charges; artificial splitting of value for part consignments, etc. (chairman, Sewing Machine Rehabilitation, 2007). Trade 
misinvoicing is usually performed through (formally) unrelated parties. It typically results in discrepancies between recorded 
exports and import prices, and may lead to capital flight (because the outflow is unrecorded). 
Abusive transfer pricing (also known as transfer-price manipulation, or transfer mispricing) refers to the manipulation of 
transfer prices within a multi-national firm. Integrated companies with a taxable presence in more than one country have an 
incentive to avoid taxes by manipulating transfer prices (Readhead 2016a, 1016b and 2017b; Guj et al. 2017). For example, 
by under-pricing mineral sales to an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction, multinationals can shift profits to low-tax countries and 
save taxes. The risk of transfer pricing manipulation is not limited to output prices, i.e. the purchase/sale price of the traded 
commodity. It also relates to input prices, comprising the provision of goods and services by related entities (IGF 2017). For 
example, an affiliated marketing hub in a low-tax jurisdiction may charge or receive disproportionate service fees or discounts 
on the price of commodities purchased or sold, so as to shift profits to the low-tax jurisdiction. In transfer price manipulation, 
there are generally no discrepancies in bilateral trade data, since the same price is reported on both sides of the transaction. 
The transferred profit does not technically constitute capital flight, since the outflow is recorded.
Source: Musselli and Bürgi (forthcoming) 2019; United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax  Matters 
2018.
1 On the automatic exchange of financial account information, refer to Chapter 1.3.
2 For an overview of exchange on request, refer to the analysis in Chapter 1.1.
3 Refer to the analysis in Chapter 1.4.
4 On tax rulings, refer to Chapter 1.2.
CDE WORKING PAPER 4  I   Curbing Illicit Financial Flows in Commodity Trading: Tax Transparency
16
This report addresses these questions with reference to Switzerland’s legal framework and practices in rela-
tion to EOI for tax purposes. The present review seeks to take stock of major legal developments regarding 
EOI in tax matters in Switzerland, while assessing the relevance of these developments in terms of Swiss 
efforts to curb commodity trade-related IFFs. The analysis is practice oriented. The overarching concern is 
to assess whether Swiss cooperation in tax matters will help to improve transparency regarding commodity 
trading.5 
The analysis proceeds as follows:
-  Chapter 1 sets the stage for the core analyses in subsequent chapters. It outlines the main features of the 
most-relevant EOI procedures and illustrates their implementation in Swiss practice. 
-  Chapter 2 considers Switzerland’s network of EOI arrangements. It specifically considers whether Switzer-
land’s treaty network comprehensively covers developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable and 
those whose leading exports to Switzerland include commodities. 
-  The analysis in Chapter 3 further discusses whether the type of information that can be exchanged under 
different exchange procedures is useful to assess commodity trade mispricing. It singles out exchange on 
request, spontaneous exchange of tax rulings, and exchange of CbC reports as possibly the most relevant. 
These procedures can in principle provide tax administrations with focused and useful information for 
investigating commodity trade mispricing. 
-  Chapter 4 points to procedural constraints and built-in limits that tend to limit the operational significance 
of EOI in investigating commodity trade mispricing. This is illustrated by way of case scenarios, using the 
example of Ghana. The focus is on exchange of information on request, with only limited consideration 
of other exchange procedures. 
-  Chapter 5 draws attention to the current rather strict conditions that must be fulfilled before the ex-
change can be activated. The requirements are tight, particularly in the context of automatic exchange 
procedures, and tend to inhibit the participation of poor countries in the exchange. This is illustrated with 
reference to the policy options a country like Laos possesses to access exchange frameworks. 
-  The analysis concludes by highlighting the potential and limits of information exchange in tax matters to 
improve transparency in commodity trading. It also points to alternative regulatory approaches that may 
provide viable means to effectively stem tax avoidance and evasion in relation to commodity trading. 
The analysis used a combination of secondary research and semi-structured interviews with key informants. 
Literature review, data analysis, and other desk-based work was carried out between January and March 
2018. This was followed by a second phase of semi-structured interviews with key institutional stakeholders 
(June–November 2018). Interviews were held with staff of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, 
the State Secretariat for International Financial Matters, and the Swiss Federal Tax Administration, including 
the Service for Exchange of Information in Tax Matters and the Collection Division. The interviews aimed at 
cross-checking the accuracy of the analysis, and gaining insights into how the exchange operates in prac-
tice. The report reflects the legal and regulatory framework as of October 2018.
5 For a broader development perspective on Switzerland’s administrative assistance tax matters, see Bürgi and Meyer-Nandi 2014, Meyer-
Nandi 2018, Matteotti 2018. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have questioned the effectiveness and legitimacy of mainstream forms of tax 
cooperation. See, in particular, Tax Justice Network (2009 and 2012). 
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 Setting the Stage: A Multi-track Framework
1 Setting the Stage: A Multi-track Framework
Exchange of information between tax authorities, also referred to as administrative assistance in tax mat-
ters, is multi-track. It can occur through different exchange channels and procedures, including on request, 
spontaneous, or automatic. While in substance these procedures may overlap and intersect, they remain 
formally and legally distinct and need to be tackled separately. The following sections outline the main fea-
tures of the most-prominent EOI mechanisms as applied in Swiss practice, in order to set the stage for more 
detailed analyses in the following chapters. The analysis ends with some summary observations that include 
broad normative considerations. The focus is on administrative assistance in tax matters – i.e. exchange of 
information between tax authorities. Other exchange of information channels – between judicial authorities 
(international mutual assistance in criminal tax matters) and to enforce financial market laws (international 
cooperation by FINMA) – fall outside the scope of this report.
1.1 Exchange of tax information on request (EOIR)
1.1.1 In a nutshell
Exchange of information on request describes a situation in which one country’s tax authority asks for par-
ticular information from another country’s tax authority. Typically, the request relates to an examination, 
inquiry, or investigation of a taxpayer’s tax liability for identified tax years (OECD 2006). The exchange is 
not confined to tax information narrowly defined (e.g. a tax return filed with the tax authority). As outlined 
in Chapter 3 and Box 6, it can cover ownership information (e.g. the identity of the shareholders and/or 
beneficial owners of a company), bank information (e.g. the activity taking place in a bank account and 
the account balance), or accounting and transaction-level records (e.g. commercial invoices, invoices of 
forwarding agents, and customs documents, if relevant). The information sought may already be at the 
disposal of the requested tax authority, or it may be held by a third party, for example a bank or a fiduci-
ary – in which case the requested authority will have to implement specific collection measures in order to 
obtain the information (OECD 2006).
The international standard for transparency and exchange of information on request for tax purposes has 
been set by the OECD-sponsored Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Pur-
poses (OECD 2016a). The standard reflects major developments in tax transparency since the early 2000s. 
It is aligned with the 2002 OECD Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) and its commentary 
(OECD 2011b), and reflects Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and its commentary, as updated 
in 2017 (OECD 2017g). It also echoes Article 26 of the UN Model Tax Convention (United Nations 2011), 
which largely reflects the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1.1.2 Implementation in Switzerland
On 13 March 2009, the Federal Council publicly announced that Switzerland would exchange information 
in tax matters in line with the internationally agreed standard. Under standard compliant EOI clauses, in 
line with Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the Swiss tax authority will exchange information 
“to the widest possible extent”: exchange of information is provided on request for the administration 
and enforcement of the domestic tax laws of the requesting state (a “major” information clause), without 
regard to the existence of a domestic tax interest in Switzerland, or the application of a dual criminality 
standard. The information sought may refer to non-Swiss residents and may relate to the administration or 
enforcement of taxes beyond those on income and capital (unless otherwise stated in the exchange instru-
ment). The request may refer to a single identified taxpayer, or it may refer to a group of taxpayers identified 
specifically in connection with similar “patterns of facts” (Oberson, 2015a, 21; OECD Commentary n. 5.2 
ad Art. 26 par. 1 OECD Model Tax Convention). Information is not limited to taxpayer-specific informa-
tion. It can also relate, for example, to risk analysis techniques or tax avoidance or evasion schemes (OECD 
Commentary 5.4 ad Art. 26 par. 1 OECD Model Tax Convention). However, so-called “fishing expeditions”, 
i.e. “random, speculative requests, with no apparent nexus with an ongoing tax inquiry or investigation” 
(OECD Commentary 5 ad Art. 26 par. 1) are not authorized. Apart from this limit, all “foreseeably relevant 
information” – whether bank, ownership, or accounting information – must be provided, and the evalu-
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ation of the relevance of the request is a matter for the requesting state. The EOI obligations stipulated 
in a standard-compliant EOI treaty override domestic bank secrecy rules (Art. 26 para. 5 OECD Model Tax 
Convention).
Figure 1: Exchange of information on request, Switzerland
Source: Authors, based on interviews with Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA) as well as on the LAAF (SR 651.1).
While fairly broad on paper, implementation of the EOIR in Swiss practice has some limits. 
First, there must be a legal basis to exchange information on request, such as a double tax agreement (DTA) 
with an EOI provision, a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA), or the joint OECD/Council of Europe 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (CMAAT). The EOI instrument must be in force 
in both Switzerland and the exchange partner.6 As discussed earlier, the exchange may also be based on a do-
mestic law provision “operationalized” by MoUs, should Switzerland decide to adopt a “unilateral” approach. 
Second, the terms of the exchange depend on the exchange of information provision in the applicable tax 
treaty. The Swiss tax authority will exchange information in line with the global standard if so provided in 
the EOI provision. Note, in particular, that Switzerland has not lifted its domestic bank secrecy in general. 
The Loi fédérale du 28 septembre 2012 sur l’assistance administrative internationale en matière fiscale 
(LAAF),7 which regulates the exchange on request (and spontaneous), requires that the equivalent to para-
graph 5 of Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention be included in a treaty to allow exchange of bank 
6 In Switzerland, entry into force takes long. Once agreed and initialled, an EOI agreement – whether a DTC, a TIEA, or a protocol to an existing 
agreement - is forwarded to the cantons and interested economic circles for consultations. The text of the agreement is then presented to the 
federal Council for approbation of signature. After the signature, it is sent to Parliament with an explanatory report (message), for final approba-
tion. The approbation by the Parliament is followed by the publication of a federal decree (arrêté fédéral), which can be subject to a referendum 
if 50,000 citizens ask for such referendum within 100 days from its official publication (OECD, 2016c).
7 Loi fédérale du 28 septembre 2012 sur l’assistance administrative internationale en matière fiscale (Loi sur l’assistance administrative fiscale, 
LAAF), SR 651.1 [herefater, LAAF].
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information. Switzerland’s treaties concluded since March 2009 include this clause and explicitly provide 
for the exchange of bank information. However, there remain DTAs concluded prior to March 2009 that do 
not include such clauses, do not permit exchange of bank information, and include a “minor” information 
clause only: requests made pursuant to these agreements still do not allow exchange of bank information 
and are limited to information necessary to carry out the provisions of the DTA. 
Switzerland also maintains strong rules and procedures regarding taxpayers’ rights, as outlined in Figure 1. 
Under Swiss law,8 the person targeted by the information request as well as all persons entitled to appeal 
are notified in writing of the main points of the information request before it takes place. The person tar-
geted has the right to inspect the file and to appeal, which suspends the notification procedure.
Finally, there are significant constraints in terms of operational principles, as well as stringent requirements 
before an EOI can take place. In particular, any information exchanged must be treated confidential by both 
the sending and the receiving tax administration. Confidentiality must be ensured before and during the 
transmission of the information, and after the information is received.
These limits are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings
1.2.1 In a nutshell
In some jurisdictions, taxpayers are entitled to request a tax ruling from the domestic tax authority, to clarify 
the tax consequences of a business structure or transaction.9 Advance pricing agreements (APA) are a special 
sub-set of tax rulings that specify how transfer pricing rules will apply to specific transactions between related 
parties.10 While a tax ruling can be granted on any tax issue, an APA relates only to the application of transfer 
pricing regulations. In certain countries, tax rulings are legally binding agreements between taxpayers and tax 
authorities, while in other jurisdictions they consist of more informal arrangements between tax authorities 
and taxpayers (United Nations 2017, at 391). Tax rulings (and APAs) can be unilateral, when issued by one 
country, or bi- or multilateral, when agreed between the taxpayer and two or more countries. They can be 
taxpayer-specific or general: the former are tailored to a specific taxpayer, suitable only for a particular situa-
tion, and can also modify the domestic tax legislation of a country through a “special proceeding” (source); 
the latter can apply to groups or types of taxpayers, or in relation to a defined set of circumstances. While 
general rulings are often published, taxpayer-specific rulings are typically secretive and confidential.
With a view to finding a balance between the potential downsides11 and upsides12 of taxpayer-specific rul-
ings, the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS) has set a framework for the compulsory 
exchange of tax rulings that might raise BEPS concerns. The objective is not to publish or abolish BEPS-prone 
8 LAAF, SR 651.1.
9 In Switzerland, the Ordonnance sur l’assistance administrative fiscale (OAAF, SR 651.11) defines a tax ruling as advice, confirmation or assur-
ance of a tax administration, in oral or written from, that: (i) is specifically issued to a taxpayer upon request; (ii) concerns the tax consequences 
of a set of facts described by the taxpayer; (iii) on which the taxpayer can rely (source).
10 APAs are defined in the United Nations Transfer Pricing Manual as “instrument through which countries can pre-determine, in agreement 
with the taxpayer, the result of the application of the arm’s length standard to a particular transaction or sets of transactions, based on certain 
sets of criteria (transfer pricing methods, comparables and appropriate adjustment thereto, critical assumptions as to future events, etc.)” (United 
Nations 2017, 391).
11 Unilateral tax rulings – and APAs in particular – raise specific profit shifting concerns, as they may endorse aggressive tax planning schemes 
with spillover effects across tax jurisdictions (Cobham 2018b, Ryding 2018). They may also give rise to integrity concerns and associated equity 
issues absent a ‘robust’ ruling review process (United Nations 2017, 468). According to an investigation by the International Consortium of Inves-
tigative Journalists, about 340 companies reportedly secured secret tax deals from the tax authorities in Luxembourg that allowed many of them 
to significantly reduce their global tax bills (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists n.d.). Since June 2013, the European Commission 
has been reviewing the tax ruling practices of Member States; several schemes were found illegal under EU State aid rules (European Commission 
n.d.). For example, the European Commission concluded that Ireland granted undue tax benefits of up to €13 billion to Apple; that Luxembourg 
granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million and allowed two Engie group companies to avoid paying taxes on almost all their 
profits for about a decade; that Luxembourg and the Netherlands granted selective tax advantages to Fiat Finance and Trade and Starbucks, 
respectively; that Belgium granted selective tax advantages under its “excess profit” tax scheme to at least 35 multinationals mainly from the EU. 
These benefits were found illegal under EU state aid rules. The Commission’s Decisions were appealed before the International Court of Justice.
12 Particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity, tax rulings are a useful instruments for tax administrations to gain insights into opaque 
cross-border activities, to forecast how much tax revenue can be generated, and to save resources employed toward tax auditing (Meyer-Nandi 
2018a, at 58-59; Matteotti 2018, at 17; United Nations 2017, at 375, 392, 458). It has also been observed that bilateral APAs between developed 
and developing countries may be purposively designed with a development policy aim, so as to allocate a bigger share of profits to the developing 
country (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, at 58-59).
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rulings per se, but to improve transparency in relation to those rulings. This objective is attained by obliging 
the issuing tax administration to exchange certain tax rulings with all the countries where the ruling may 
give rise to BEPS concerns. The international standard, part of the BEPS Action 5 minimum standard, speci-
fies the information-gathering process, the modalities of the information exchange, and the confidentiality 
requirements (OECD 2015a). Over 100 jurisdictions – or Inclusive Framework members – have committed to 
implement the standard and will take part in a peer review to assess its domestic implementation. 
1.2.2 Implementation in Switzerland
Switzerland has implemented the OECD standard for the compulsory spontaneous exchange of information 
in respect of tax rulings. The domestic legal framework entered into force on 1 January 2017 and became 
operative in 2018 (first exchange of tax rulings). In general, only information on tax rulings issued from 1 
January 2010 and still applicable on 1 January 2018 may be exchanged (State Secretariat for International 
Financial Matters 2018d).
In line with the OECD standard, the exchange obligation covers five categories of rulings that raise specific 
BEPS concerns (Table 1). General rulings and tax settlements reached as a result of an audit are not covered 
by the spontaneous exchange framework.
Table 1: Taxpayer-specific rulings subject to “compulsory” spontaneous exchange in Switzerland
Tier Definition
Preferential regime 
rulings
Rulings relating to taxation of a holding company, a domicile company, a principal company, 
or a mixed company
Rulings relating to the reduced taxation of revenue from intellectual property (Patent Box of 
the Canton of Nidwalden; Patent Box proposed to be introduced as part of the Corporate Tax 
Reform)
Transfer pricing rulings Unilateral tax rulings covering cross-border transfer prices, including cross-border unilateral 
APAs and any other cross-border unilateral tax rulings
Rulings resulting in 
downward adjustment 
of profits
Cross-border rulings providing for a unilateral downward adjustment to the taxpayer’s taxable 
profits that is not directly reflected in the taxpayer’s financial/commercial accounts” (e.g. excess 
profit rulings, informal capital rulings, and other similar rulings)
Permanent establish-
ment (PE) rulings
Rulings concerning the existence or absence of a PE, and the attribution of profits to the PE
Related party conduit 
rulings
Rulings covering arrangements involving cross-border flows of funds or income through a 
conduit entity in the country giving the ruling
Source: OECD 2015a; OAAF, SR 651.11.
The exchange framework is outlined in Figure 2. The information is exchanged spontaneously in the sense 
that Switzerland passes on the information to its exchange partners without the latter specifically request-
ing it. On the other hand, it is compulsory in the sense that the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA) is 
subject to the obligation to spontaneously transmit the information with its exchange partners – hence the 
term “compulsory spontaneous exchange”. 
As under the EOIR procedure, in general13 the FTA will notify the affected taxpayer before the exchange of 
information with the recipient state takes place. The taxpayer then has the right to inspect the file and make 
an appeal – with suspensive effects on the exchange. The information exchanged is treated confidentially, 
as under the EOIR procedure (refer to Chapter 4).
As a general rule, the information on rulings is exchanged with the country of residence of the topmost re-
sponsible entity within the corporate hierarchy (ultimate parent company), as well as the residence country 
of the company that has a direct controlling interest in the company to which the ruling applies (immediate 
parent company). Further, the information is dispatched to the countries of residence of all related parties 
(25% equity interest/vote threshold) that may be affected by the ruling, as detailed in the diagramme below. 
13 Apart from exceptional cases where there is a risk of circumvention.
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Figure 2: Spontaneous exchange of tax ruling from Switzerland to a foreign jurisdiction
Switzerland will not exchange tax rulings unless a legal basis for the exchange exists – either a DTA or a 
TIEA explicitly providing for spontaneous exchange of information, or the CoE/OECD MCAAT. The FTA is 
entitled to limit the exchange to partners that have adopted the OECD standard in respect of the compul-
sory spontaneous exchange of tax ruling (OECD members, non-OECD G20 countries, and other members 
of the Inclusive Framework).14 
14 Ordonnance du 23 novembre 2016 sur l’assistance administrative internationale en matière fiscale [hereafter, Ordonnance sur l’assistance 
administrative fiscale, OAAF] (SR 651.11), Art.10 (4).
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1.3 Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (AEOI)
1.3.1 In a nutshell
The AEOI standard in tax matters involves the bulk, standardized transmission of non-resident financial ac-
count information from the “offshore” (source) country to the country of residence of the account holder. 
The new standard is a major breakthrough in the fight against offshore tax evasion, particularly in relation 
to undeclared offshore bank accounts.
Since 2013, the political focus has shifted towards AEOI as the new global paradigm for transparency and 
exchange of information in tax matters. The EU Savings Directive (2003), the Foreign Account Tax Compli-
ance Act (FATCA) of the United States in 2010, as well as the revised CoE/OECD CMAAT were key drivers of 
widespread AEOI.15 In September 2013, the G20 leaders endorsed the OECD proposal as a global model for 
automatic exchange of information. In June 2014, the global standard for AEOI – the Common Reporting 
Standard (CRS), commentaries, and technical XLM Schema – was agreed upon the OECD, and subsequently 
adopted by the G20 in September 2014.
1.3.2 Implementation in Switzerland
As summarized by the Swiss administration, in Switzerland the new standard provides that certain finan-
cial institutions, collective investment vehicles, and insurance companies collect financial information for 
tax purposes on their clients residing abroad. This information covers all types of investment income and 
account balances. The information is automatically transmitted once a year to the tax authority, which 
transmits the data for the client to the respective tax authority abroad (Swiss Federal Department of Finance 
2016). Key aspects of the standards, as implemented in Switzerland by the Loi fédérale sur l’échange au-
tomatique de reinsegnements en matière fiscal (LEAR),16 are summarized in Box 2. 
Box 2:  Automatic exchange of tax information in Switzerland
Who reports? Financial institutions (FIs) comprising depository institutions, custodial institutions, investment entities, and 
insurance companies. This generally includes banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions, brokers and central securi-
ties depositories, portfolio managers, asset managers and other entities investing or trading in financial instruments, as well as 
most life insurance companies (OECD 2017c). The entity must reside in Switzerland. The standard concerns Swiss-based banks, 
including the Swiss branches of foreign banks. The foreign branches of Swiss banks are excluded from reporting obligations, as 
well as specific low-risk entities – for example, public entities, diplomatic missions, central banks, and pension funds.
What has to be reported (and exchanged)? FIs disclose data in respect of financial accounts17 held or controlled by 
persons/entities that are resident for tax purposes in a jurisdiction with which Switzerland has AEOI agreement in place. 
Concretely, Switzerland has a published list of jurisdictions with which it has an AEOI in place (reportable jurisdictions). In the 
first instance, a Swiss bank must check whether the financial account it maintains is held by an individual or entity resident 
for tax purposes in a listed jurisdiction. It does not matter whether the account holder is a physical person or a legal entity – a 
company, a trust, or a foundation. Accounts held by publicly listed companies and their related entities, government entities, 
international organizations, central banks, and other financial institutions are generally excluded, even if the holder resides in 
a listed jurisdiction. If the account holder is a “passive non-financial entity”,18 the bank will need to look through the entity to 
identify the controlling person. The information that gets reported and exchanged is quite broad. It identifies the account and 
the account holder concerned, the account balance, as well as the activity taking place in the account – interest, dividends, 
account balance or value, income from certain insurance products, sales proceeds from financial assets and other income 
generated with respect to assets held in the account or payments made in respect of the account. 
To whom is the information reported and exchanged? Swiss banks (and other non-bank FIs) will pass the details of foreign 
clients to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA), which then passes this data on to countries with which it has signed an AEOI 
treaty.
15 In particular, with the enactment of FATCA in 2010, the United States unilaterally pushed for automatic, routine exchange of financial ac-
count information as the new global standard.
16 Loi fédérale du 18 décembre 2015 sur l’échange international automatique de renseignements en matière fiscale (LEAR), SR 653.1.
17 Under the AEOI standard, the term includes Depository Accounts, Custodial Accounts, Equity and debt interests, Cash Value Insurance Con-
tracts and Annuity Contracts; certain low risk accounts are excluded (OECD 2015b, 2017a, 2017c).
18 A “passive non-financial entity” is an entity, other than a financial institution, that has no trading activities and essentially receives or holds 
passive income, such as dividends, interest, rents etc. The definition excludes entities that are publicly traded (or related to a publicly traded 
Entity), Governmental Entities, International Organisations, Central Banks, or a holding NFEs of nonfinancial groups (apart from non-financial in-
vestment entities). The controlling person, or “beneficial owner”, is “the natural person(s) who exercises control over the Entity, generally natural 
person(s) with a controlling ownership interest in the Entity […] Controlling Persons include any natural person that holds directly or indirectly 
more than 25 percent of the shares or voting rights of an Entity as a beneficial owner. If no such person exists, then any natural person that 
otherwise exercises control over the management of the Entity (e.g., the senior managing official of the company)” (OECD 2015b, at 47).
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The diagramme below (Figure 3) depicts the flow of information from Switzerland to a “listed” jurisdiction. 
Figure 3: AEOI from Switzerland
Source: Swiss Federal Council 2017; Swiss Federal Department of Finance 2018; OECD 2015b
For the AEOI to take place, the account holder must be resident for tax purposes in a jurisdiction with which 
Switzerland has “activated” the AEOI. Switzerland has committed to implement the AEOI with all interested 
partners that meet the stringent AEOI requirements (refer to Chapter 2). The “activation” of a bilateral 
exchange relationship may derive from a bilateral or multilateral instrument (Box 3). 
Box 3: AEOI under the CRS MCAA
Bilateral track: Under the bilateral track, the exchange is based on a DTA, a TIEA, or another bilateral treaty that specifically 
provides for the automatic exchange of tax information. Based on the treaty, the parties enter into a bilateral competent 
authority agreement (CAA) which sets out the operational details of the exchange. Switzerland has activated the AEOI on a 
bilateral basis with the EU, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
Multilateral track: Switzerland generally implements the AEOI multilaterally, based on the Multilateral Competent Authority 
Agreement on the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (hereafter referred to as the “Common Reporting 
Standard”, or CRS MCAA). The latter is a multilateral “framework” convention: a particular exchange relationship between 
countries party to the MCAA becomes effective only if it is bilaterally activated. This occurs when Switzerland and its exchange 
partner: (1) have in force the CoE/OECD MCAAT, which provides the legal basis for the exchange; (2) sign the CRS MCAA, 
which “operationalizes” the automatic exchange provision of the MCAAT; (3) “list” each other as exchange partners under the 
CRS MCAA; and (4) file with the CRS MCCA secretariat (the OECD) a set of notifications as regards the needed legal, opera-
tional, and IT infrastructure for implementing the AEOI standard. A particular bilateral relationship under the CRS MCAA enters 
into force only if both jurisdictions have the CoE/OECD MCAAT in effect, have filed all the notifications, and have listed each 
other. Note also that Switzerland subjects its “listed” exchange partners to a review process before the exchange occurs (refer 
to Chapter 2 for further details). The exchange is delayed or suspended until all the review requirements are met.
Source: Swiss Federal Council 2017 and 2018; Swiss Federal Department of Finance 2017; OECD 2015b
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1.4 Exchange of CbC Reports
1.4.1 In a nutshell
The CbC standard (OECD 2015c) requires parent companies to file in their home country a new CbC re-
porting template providing a clear overview of where its profits, sales, employees, and assets are located, 
and where taxes are paid and accrued. The highest-level legal entity of the “MNE Group” (ultimate parent 
company) must prepare and file its CbC report with the tax administration in its jurisdiction of tax residence. 
That tax administration must automatically exchange the CbC report with each jurisdiction in which the 
MNE Group operates. This exchange is based on an International Agreement – e.g. the multilateral Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, a Double Tax Convention, or a Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement – permitting automatic exchange of information. It is subject to the terms of a Quali-
fying Competent Authority Agreement (CAA) which sets out the operational details of the exchange of CbC 
reports. Other filing mechanisms – “surrogate parent filing” and “local filing” – can be used in specific cases 
as an alternative to the general mechanism (OECD 2015c, at 11).
The standard is set by the OECD/G20 BEPS Action 13, one of the four BEPS minimum standards subject 
to peer review. Its terms are stringent: CbC reports must be filed in a form identical to and applying the 
definitions and instructions contained in the standard template set out in Annex III to Chapter V of the 
2015 Action 13 Report. An implementation package sets out model legislation and model exchange instru-
ments to facilitate consistent implementation of the standard across countries. All members of the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS have committed to implementing the CbC standard and to participating in the peer 
review process. 
1.4.2 Implementation in Switzerland
In Switzerland, the legal bases for the automatic exchange of CbC reports – the Multilateral Competent 
Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports (CbC MCAA), the associated law and 
the related ordinance – entered into force in December 2017. MNEs in Switzerland are required to draw up 
a CbC report as of the 2018 tax year. Switzerland will exchange CbC reports on a reciprocal basis beginning 
in 2020 (State Secretariat for International Financial Matters 2018a). 
The obligation to prepare CbC reports concerns Swiss-resident (ultimate) parent companies, i.e. companies 
that: (1) have their registered office or place of effective management in Switzerland; (ii) are required to 
prepare consolidated annual accounts under Swiss law;19 and (iii) are not themselves controlled by an en-
tity whose consolidated accounts are prepared and audited in accordance with Swiss or equivalent foreign 
regulations.20 Only Swiss-resident parent companies with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or 
exceeding CHF 900 million are subject to the CbC reporting requirement.
The Swiss-resident parent company must prepare and file with the Federal Tax Administration a CbC report 
containing the following information: aggregate figures of the MNE Group’s revenue, gross profit or loss, 
income tax, stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees, and tangible assets, broken down 
by tax jurisdiction; a list of all entities included in the consolidated financial statement of the Group, setting 
out the jurisdiction of tax residence, and where different, the jurisdiction under the laws of which the entity 
is organized, and the nature of its main business activity or activities; all other relevant information. 
The Swiss Federal Tax Administration must automatically transmit the CbC report on a regular (quarterly) 
basis to the tax authorities of the countries where the MNE operates – i.e. the tax jurisdictions listed in the 
CbC report. 
19 Pursuant to Article 963 paragraphs 1–3 CO (RO 27 321).
20 Pursuant to Article Art. 963 (1) CO (RO 27 321), “Where a legal entity that is required to file financial reports controls one or more undertak-
ings that are required to file financial reports, the entity must prepare consolidated annual accounts (consolidated accounts) in the annual report 
for all the undertakings controlled”. Under Art 963 (2), “A legal entity controls another undertaking if it: 1. directly or indirectly holds a majority 
of votes in the highest management body; 2. directly or indirectly has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the supreme 
management or administrative body; or 3. it is able to exercise a controlling influence based on the articles of association, the foundation deed, 
a contract or comparable instruments”.
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The report is exchanged as long as a bilateral legal foundation for exchange is maintained, that is, only with 
countries that are party to the CbC MCAA (and the MCAAT) and are bilaterally “listed” by Switzerland as 
CbC exchange partners. 
The recipient jurisdiction must keep in place and enforce the necessary laws, operational procedures, and 
infrastructure to ensure confidentiality, data protection, and proper use of the information contained in the 
CbC reports.
Figure 4: Exchange of CbC reports
1.5 Summary observations
A few observations emerge from this basic outline of EOI mechanisms. In particular, two aspects concern-
ing the technical aspects of the information exchange and its implementation in practice merit discussion. 
Further, the benchmarks against which EOI laws and practices are assessed and the balance of interests that 
EOI instruments conceal are worthy of analysis. These points are introduced below.
A patchwork of procedures
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are several, compartmentalized exchange-of-information 
procedures in tax matters. These procedures partly overlap with respect to the exchanged information, 
but they are separate and distinct in terms of legal bases, procedural requirements, and responsible units 
(see Table 2 and Box 4). Note in particular that the procedural requirements differ regarding information 
exchange on request or spontaneously, on the one hand, and regarding automatic exchange, on the other. 
First, automatic exchange mechanisms (in relation to both financial account information and CbC reports) 
have more lenient “client procedures” than exchange-on-request procedures: the taxpayer concerned is 
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 notified once, before the first exchange takes place, and may consult a civil court to assess its rights.21 
Second, given the bulk nature of the exchange, AEOI requires specific transmission channels and proto-
cols, alongside appropriate operational security measures – well beyond what is required under the EOIR 
procedure. Specifically, the AEOI team must have the capacity to encrypt and securely send encoded (XML) 
bundles of information to the resident-country tax authorities; the receiving administration must be able to 
decrypt and process bulk data and automatically match the decoded data against tax returns declared in 
the country. This requires specialized skill sets, sophisticated IT infrastructure and services, and operational 
procedures that do not apply to EOIR or spontaneous exchange.
Box 4: EOI in Switzerland: Administrative division of labour
In Switzerland, EOI in tax matters is administered by the Federal Tax Administration (FTA). Within the FTA (Main Division for 
Federal Direct Tax, Anticipatory Tax and Stamp Duty), the Collection Division administers the automatic procedures (automatic 
exchange of financial account information and CbC reports); the Service for Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (SEI) is in 
charge of procedures of exchange on request and spontaneous exchange of information. The FTA administers the exchange 
procedures; it does not negotiate the legal bases for the exchange. The negotiation of EOI instruments (DTAs, TIEAs, multilateral 
arrangements) is entrusted to the State Secretariat for International Finance (SIF), which represents Switzerland’s interests in 
financial, monetary, and tax matters vis-à-vis partner countries and in the competent international bodies. The administrative 
workload has grown dramatically, as reflected in the rapid expansion of the EOI teams. SEI was staffed with four employees 
when established in 2011; it now has 70 staff. The recently established AEOI team is staffed by six employees (five full-time 
equivalent). 
Source: Desk research and interviews with FTA/SEI, the FTA/AEOI team, and SIF.
Figure 5: EOI in Switzerland
Source: Interviews with FTA/SEI, FTA/AEOI team, SIF and desk research. Note: This is not an official organization chart: the authors 
made this chart based on the information from different sources.
21 Pursuant to Article 14 of the LEAR (SR 653.1), the reporting FI shall notify the person concerned by the 31st of January of the year when the 
first exchange of information occurs. The person concerned has five months to request the rectification of inaccurate data, or a suspension of 
the exchange if such exchange risks causing particularly serious and disproportionate harm, particularly where the guarantees for the rule of law 
are absent in the receiving state (Art. 19 of the LEAR (SR 653.1); Art. 5 and 6 Loi fédérale du 19 juin 1992 sur la protection des données (LPD) 
(SR 235.1); Art. 25a Loi fédérale du 20 décembre 1968 sur la procédure administrative (PA) (SR 172.021). In case of disagreement with the tax 
administration, the person concerned can appeal in court, in civil proceedings.
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 Setting the Stage: A Multi-track Framework
Legal foundations of exchange
The preconditions for exchange of information on tax matters are stringent, particularly with regard to auto-
matic exchange procedures, as highlighted in this initial overview and discussed further in Chapter 5. Infor-
mation exchange is only possible where adequate laws and regulations are in place regarding the availability, 
gathering, and transmission of tax information (OECD 2016). Further, jurisdictions must have in place and 
enforce particular standards of confidentiality, data safeguarding, and proper use of information. The first set 
of conditions – i.e. that the information exists and the administrative authority can gather it from the informa-
tion holder and transmit it abroad – is necessary for countries to collect and supply the requested information. 
These conditions concern the “supply side” of the exchange, and are only relevant when the exchange is fully 
reciprocal. This is an area very demanding in terms of domestic law requirements; an area where poor coun-
tries face hurdles due to gaps in their domestic laws and practices, which are often rudimentary. Requirements 
on confidentiality, data safeguard and proper use of the information are relevant whatever the nature of the 
exchange – reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Note in this respect that even if a country does not reciprocate the 
exchange, it shall nonetheless treat the information received as secret and apply the needed safeguards with 
regard to confidentiality, data protection, and proper use of the information. Setting up these safeguards at 
the legal and operational level may entail high costs for poor countries. It also raises sustainability issues, in 
contexts of low connectivity, absence of IT support services and infrastructure, and power shortages. 
Table 2: Switzerland’s administrative assistance in tax matters: Legal bases and underpinnings
 International 
 standard
Legal frame-
work in  
Switzerland
Legal bases 
for the  
exchange
Domestic law requirements in the  
receiving State
EOIR OECD-spon-
sored Global 
Forum on 
Transparency 
and Exchange 
of Informa-
tion for Tax 
Purposes 
Federal Act of 
28 September 
2012 on Internal 
Administrative 
Assistance in Tax 
Matters (SR 651.1) 
and related Ordi-
nance (SR 651.11)
DTC, TIEA, CoE/
OECD CMAAT, 
FATCA, EU-
Swiss exchange 
arrangements
Confidentiality and data protection safeguards: 
As specified in the applicable convention (DTA, 
TIEA, CoE/OECD CMAAT).
Spontaneous 
exchange of 
tax rulings
OECD/G20 
BEPS Project 
(Action 5)
As above DTC, TIEA, CoE/
OECD CMAAT
As specified in the applicable convention (DTA, 
TIEA, CoE/OECD CMAAT). Under the OECD 
standard (Action 5), domestic laws must be 
in place in the receiving country to protect 
confidentiality of the information exchanged, 
and effective penalties must apply for unauthor-
ized disclosures; the information exchanged may 
be used only for the purposes permitted by the 
information exchange instrument, which prevails 
over domestic law as regards the use of the 
information.
AEOI CRS OECD/G20 
AEOI CRS
Federal Act on 
the Automatic 
Exchange of 
Information (SR 
653.1) and related 
AEOI Ordinance 
(SR 653.11) and 
Guidelines
Multilat-
eral: CoE/OECD 
MCAAT + CRS 
MCAA
Bilateral: DTC 
or TIEA cover-
ing automatic 
exchange + 
Bilateral CAA
Under the AEOI CRS, the exchange jurisdictions 
will have in place:
 Domestic CRS laws and regulations;
  Standardized methods for electronic data 
transmission including encryption, as per 
AEOI standard;
  Laws, operational procedures, and IT in-
frastructure to ensure confidentiality, data 
protection, and proper use of the informa-
tion, as per AEOI CRS (Article 22 of the CoE/
OECD MCAAT, OECD CRS (2017c), section 5 
and annex 4 (example questionnaire)).
Exchange of 
CbC reports
OECD/G20 
BEPS Project 
(Action 13)
Federal Act of 16 
June 2017 on the 
International Au-
tomatic Exchange 
of CbC reports (SR 
654.1) and the 
related Ordinance 
(SR 654.11).
Multilat-
eral: CoE/OECD 
MCAAT + CbC 
MCAA
Bilateral: DTC/
TIEA covering 
automatic ex-
change + DTC 
CAA or TIEA 
CAA
CbC MCAA, section 8, and Action 13 Final 
Report:
The exchange jurisdictions will have in place:
  Domestic laws and regulations to require the 
filing of CbC Reports;
  tandardized methods for electronic data trans-
mission including encryption;
  Laws, operational procedures and IT infrastruc-
ture to ensure confidentiality, data protec-
tion and proper use of the information, as 
per Article 22 of the CoE/OECD MCAAT and 
paragraph 1 and Section 5 of the CbC MCAA 
(a confidentiality and data safeguard question-
naire is attached as Annex to the CbC MCAA).
Source: OECD 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a, 2017d, 2017h; LAAF (SR 651.1), OAAF (SR 651.11), LEAR (SR 653.1), OEAR (SR 
653.11), LEDPP (SR 654.1), OEDPP (SR 654.11). Also Refer to Annex 4 (EOI laws and regulations).
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The norm-setting role of the OECD
The reviewed developments in tax transparency highlight the standard-setting and law-making role of the 
OECD. The OECD-sponsored EOIR standard, and nowadays the AEOI benchmark, represent the yardstick 
of countries’ performance in terms of transparency and exchange of information in tax matters. Within the 
OECD framework, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes – es-
sentially a “soft law” framework – has efficiently spearheaded the uptake of EOI and transparency meas-
ures by monitoring compliance with the new standards. CbC reporting and the spontaneous exchange of 
information on advance tax rulings are minimum standards under the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, subject to 
monitoring and peer review by the OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS. A de facto implementation duty 
exists concerning these transparency standards, since non-compliance carries the risk of being placed on 
“black” or “grey” tax haven list. What is at stake here is the “hardening” of soft law initiatives in the con-
text of peer-review processes and auditing procedures that put significant standard-compliance pressure on 
countries. In such cases, the traditional distinction between hard and soft law approaches to international 
governance may begin to blur. Questions remain as to the democratic legitimacy of such processes. Some 
observers suggest that the OECD has effectively expanded to include non-OECD countries and turned into 
a quasi-universal body, for example, through the Global Forum and the Inclusive Framework. Others sug-
gest that these OECD initiatives represent an effort by the OECD to expand its influence globally, without 
broadening its membership or losing control of the decision-making process. This debate raises political 
economy issues that have been tackled in-depth by Brugger, Engebretsen, and Waldmeier (forthcoming 
2019) to which the reader is referred.
A complex normative balance
Finally, the specific content of the various EOI standards reflects an effort to weigh and balance compet-
ing normative interests, including tax administration information needs, concerns about taxpayer rights, 
the compliance costs and burdens imposed on business, and fair allocation of responsibilities (and costs) 
between requesting and supplying jurisdictions. The various standards strike that balance in different ways. 
For example, EOIR is wide in scope, requiring that all “foreseeably relevant information” should be ex-
changed. However, this wide scope is balanced by stringent procedures regarding taxpayers’ procedural 
rights, namely prior notification as well as the right to inspect the file and to make an appeal. Compared 
with EOIR, AEOI significantly erodes taxpayers’ rights.22 Nevertheless, this erosion is balanced by tightened 
requirements regarding confidentiality, data safeguarding, and proper use of information exchanged. The 
stipulated content of CbC reports also strives for a balance: transactional data regarding related-party 
interest payments, royalty payments, and service fees are not covered by CbC reports. These transaction-
level data may be reported in optional “Local Files” filed with the local jurisdiction, but are not part of the 
minimum standard. These are just some examples of how different transparency frameworks have been 
designed with a view to finding a balance between equally legitimate, but competing normative interests. 
Other examples are discussed below. Notably, the need to balance different interests constitutionally limits 
the reach of the transparency agenda. Trade-offs are necessary. For example, developing countries would 
certainly benefit from a loosening of confidentiality and data safeguarding requirements under the AEOI 
standard. However, tightened confidentiality safeguards are necessary balance the erosion of taxpayers’ 
privacy rights. It is not possible to ease these safeguards without undermining the whole normative balance. 
An important overarching consideration is that of cost effectiveness. As discussed earlier, implementation 
of EOI in tax matters can be very costly, particularly for poor countries. Tax administrations should strive to 
balance the potential usefulness of EOI frameworks against the expected cost and administrative burden of 
such frameworks. This assessment should also consider whether the relevant administration has the capac-
ity to use the information exchanged. These considerations are of paramount importance in the context of 
the present research. They guide the following analysis and frame its final conclusions. 
22 Personal tax information is transmitted in bulk information and regularly. The taxpayer concerned is notified once, before the first exchange 
takes place, and shall seize a civil court to assess its rights.
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2  Switzerland’s Exchange of Tax Information Framework: 
Does It Cover Poor Countries That Trade Commodities 
to or through Switzerland?
This chapter considers Switzerland’s network of EOI arrangements under various procedures, namely ex-
change on request, spontaneous exchange of tax rulings, automatic exchange of financial account informa-
tion, and automatic exchange of CbC reports. It breaks down partner countries by development status and 
income group in order to assess the extent to which the Swiss treaty network is skewed towards higher-
income actors. It further considers whether Switzerland’s treaty network comprehensively covers developing 
countries whose goods are traded through the Swiss commodity hub, including the least developed among 
them. The analysis concludes with some summary observations. 
2.1 Exchange on Request
As of 1 October 2018, Switzerland had EOIR mechanisms in place with 142 jurisdictions (states and ter-
ritories), based on DTAs, TIEAs, and the amended CoE/OECD CMAAT (for details, see Annex 1). Of these 
exchange procedures, 112 were “standard-compliant” (see Chapter 1.1). Switzerland still had 30 exchange 
arrangements not in line with the international standard,23 but has taken significant steps to upgrade these 
remaining non-compliant instruments, and to expand its network of EOI arrangements.24 The Global Forum 
rated the country “largely compliant” in relation to element C.1 of the OECD standard (“Exchange of infor-
mation mechanisms should provide for effective exchange of information”). Element C.2 (“The jurisdiction’s 
network of information exchange mechanisms should cover all relevant partners”) was rated “compliant” 
(OECD 2016c).25
 
Is Switzerland’s EOIR network broad enough to cover low-income countries, particularly the most vulnerable? 
In terms of the development status of its treaty partners, Switzerland has a sufficiently wide network of EOI 
mechanisms in place. Of Switzerland’s 112 standard-compliant exchange relationships, 46 were with “de-
veloped” countries/areas, 57 with “developing” ones, and nine with “transition” economies (Annex 1).26 
Switzerland’s treaty network was varied in terms of geography: standard-compliant EOI arrangements were 
set up with countries and territories in Europe and Central Asia (49), Latin America and the Caribbean (26), 
East Asia and the Pacific (16), the Middle East and North Africa (9), Sub-Saharan Africa (8), North America 
(2), and South Asia (2). 
Looking closer, however, it becomes evident that the Swiss treaty network is skewed towards higher-income 
states/territories: 
-  97 of the 112 standard-compliant EOI arrangements (87 percent of all standard-compliant treaties) were 
concluded with countries or territories ranked in the high-income and upper middle-income groups; 
-  Only 15 standard-compliant EOI arrangements (13 percent of all standard-compliant treaties) were with 
low-/lower-middle-income countries and territories. 
Figure 6 shows the breakdown by income status of the jurisdictions with whom Switzerland has concluded 
standard-compliant EOI arrangements.
23  As of 1 September 2018, non-standard compliant instruments were those with Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bela-
rus, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Gambia, Iran, Jamaica, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malawi, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, the Philippines, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zambia.
24 Switzerland has signed new DTAs with Kosovo, Kuwait and the USA (not yet in force); a standard-compliant agreement with Ecuador has 
been initialled; negotiations or contacts aimed at updating the existing EOI agreement are ongoing with most of the remaining countries. A 
few countries may become party to the CoE/OECD CMAAT in the near future, which will provide a legal basis for standard-compliant EOIR even 
absent a bilateral treaty. It was not possible to establish contact with the competent authorities of Gambia and Malawi, not members of the 
Global Forum. Finally, Mongolia had informed Switzerland that it was not in a position to exchange information in line with the standard owing 
to limitations in its domestic law (OECD 2016c, 113-14).
25 The assessment reflected the situation of Switzerland as at 17 May 2016.
26 Development status as per UNCTADStat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCountries_DevelopmentStatus_Hierarchy.pdf).
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Figure 6: Breakdown of Switzerland’s exchange partners by income, EOIR
Data sources and notes: Refer to Annex 1.
As detailed in Annex 1, Switzerland’s obligations to provide information are mainly directed towards ad-
vanced market economies, large developing or transition economies, and low-tax jurisdictions (including a 
few former tax havens). In other words, agreements have mainly been concluded with counterparties with 
economic significance and leverage. 
Does Switzerland’s treaty network comprehensively cover developing countries whose commodities are 
traded through the Swiss hub, including the least-developed among them? 
The following analysis matches information on standard-compliant EOI with trade data.27 The results are 
presented below. 
The analysis considers a sample of 57 developing countries whose three leading merchandise exports to 
Switzerland include one or more of the main primary commodities traded through the Swiss hub (refer to 
footnote 26). The sample is for illustrative purposes only.
Of these 57 countries, 24 (42 percent) have a tax treaty with Switzerland including a standard-compliant 
EOI provision. The majority of them (18) are high-income/upper-middle-income countries from Latin Amer-
ica, East Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia;28 only two are low-income countries29. 
The remaining countries (33 countries, or 58 percent of the sample) do not have a standard-compliant EOI 
mechanism with Switzerland; of these, 28 do not have any legal basis – whether bilateral or multilateral – 
to obtain tax information on request from Switzerland. By income group, the majority (23 out of 33) are 
low-/lower-middle-income countries; nine are in the upper-middle-income group; only one is a high-income 
country.30 The most represented countries with no legal basis for exchange of information were low-income 
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.31 
27  The analysis proceeded in four stages. It first identified major commodities traded through the Swiss hub: zinc, copper, and aluminum (base 
metals), gold (precious metal), crude oil (energy), cereals, coffee, sugar, cotton, and cocoa (soft commodities). This review was based on existing 
analyses (Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences 2016; Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs et al. 2013). Trade data were downloaded 
from UnctadStat to analyze developing countries’ export flows to Switzerland over the last three years (2014-16), disaggregated by country and 
by product (Statistics on merchandise trade by trading partner and product based on the three-digit level of the SITC commodity classification, 
Revision 3, downloaded 27/01/2018). These export trade flows also covered, to varying extent, transit trade (i.e. shipments bought by Swiss-based 
traders and sold on to buyers abroad, without entering Switzerland’s customs). For each country, exports by product (SITC Rev 3., 3-digit level, 
sum over the three years) were ranked by value in descending order; a formula extracted countries whose three leading merchandise exports to 
Switzerland included one or more of the main primary commodities traded through the Swiss hub. The list was matched with the updated list of 
countries that can request tax information to Switzerland pursuant to an EOI arrangement in line with the OECD standard (Annex 1).
28 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong SAR, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Oman, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, Uruguay.
29 Senegal and Uganda.
30 Kuwait, for which the MCAAT will enter into force on 01/12/2018, thus providing a legal baiss for a broad exchange of tax information with 
Switzerland.
31 Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, Tanzania.
High income; 
69
Upper middle 
income; 28
Lower middle 
income; 13
Low income ; 2
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Figure 7: Sample of commodity exporters to Switzerland with standard-compliant  
EOI mechanisms, breakdown by income status
Data sources and notes: Refer to footnote 27.
2.2 Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings
For a spontaneous exchange to take place, there must be a valid legal basis in force in both Switzerland 
and the recipient jurisdiction. To date, the DTAs and TIEAs signed by Switzerland do not explicitly provide 
for spontaneous exchange of information. The only valid legal basis is the CoE/OECD MCAAT. Switzerland 
exchanges tax rulings with parties to the MCAAT that have adopted the OECD standard with respect to 
spontaneous exchange of tax rulings: G20 countries, OECD members, and other members of the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS. 
Cross-checking the list of Inclusive Framework Members32 with the list of countries for which the MCAAT 
is in force reveals that few countries in low- and lower-middle-income groups have a legal basis to receive 
tax rulings from Switzerland. The only low-income country is Senegal. The other eight lower-middle-income 
countries are Cameroon, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Developing 
countries exporting commodities to Switzerland are not well represented: among the sample of 57 coun-
tries whose three leading exports to Switzerland include main commodities traded through the Swiss hub, 
only three – Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia – are covered. Laos and Ghana, for example, are excluded.33 
32 Members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Updated: October 2018 https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-com-
position.pdf, accessed 8 November 2018.
33 Ghana has the MCAAT in force but is not a member of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, which is possibly explained by the important role 
played by Ghana in the content of the UN Tax Committee. Laos has signed the MCAAT, but is not a member of the Inclusive Framework.
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2.3 Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information
As of September 2018, Switzerland had arrangements in place to automatically exchange financial account 
information with 81 jurisdictions34: 50 based on the MCAA, the remainder 3135 under bilateral treaties. 
Thirty-seven exchanges were operational. The Federal Council is proposing to activate the AEOI with eight 
further jurisdictions on a multilateral basis beginning in 2019, and has initiated internal consultation on the 
introduction of the automatic exchange with 18 further states and territories beginning in 2020. 
Outwardly, Swiss policy in implementing the AEOI appears to have evolved from restrictive to relatively 
open. As detailed in Box 5, Switzerland launched the AEOI process with 38 states and jurisdictions with 
close economic and political ties to Switzerland – all EU members and other “traditional” partners (first 
round of AEOI deals, 2017/18). It then fast-tracked agreements with Hong Kong and Singapore and 41 
further jurisdictions – large developing and transition economies, other significant commercial partners, and 
important sectoral or regional financial centres (second round, 2018/19). In addition, it selectively opened 
to non-reciprocal jurisdictions, also filling specific territorial gaps in its exchange network (third round, 
2019/20). Most recently, Switzerland has in principle opened to all states and territories that are committed 
to implementing the AEOI and meeting the requirements of the OECD standard (fourth batch, 2020/21). 
However, the expanded scope of Switzerland’s AEOI network does not mean that Switzerland will exchange 
data with all interested partners. Transmission of information to newly (post-2017) “listed” partners de-
pends on the outcome of a review process: before an initial exchange of data, the Federal Council will once 
again review whether the listed country meets the requirements of the AEOI standard, based on the federal 
decree of 6 December 2017,36 emphasizing data security and confidentiality. The exchange of data will only 
be implemented if the review conditions are met.37 
As detailed in Box 5 and Annex 2, Switzerland’s AEOI network currently favours high- or upper-middle-in-
come countries with significant economic or political leverage. Low-income and lower-middle-income coun-
tries – including those whose commodities are traded via the Swiss hub – are missing from Switzerland’s 
AEOI network. Things may change in the near future, if the Swiss exchange network is “operationalized” 
with the “fourth batch” countries, which also include lower-middle-income countries – namely, Ghana, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, and Vanuatu.
Box 5: Switzerland’s AEOI relationships
A first round of AEOI deals (2017/18) was approved with 38 states and jurisdictions – all EU members38 and other “traditional” 
partners (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, South Korea, the British crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey, and 
the Isle of Man). This first batch of exchange deals is fully “active”: Swiss banks started collecting account data concerning 
tax residents in the 38 jurisdictions beginning 1 January 2017, with the data exchanged for the first time with the respective 
partner jurisdiction in 2018. 
A second batch of deals (2018/19) was finalized with 41 additional jurisdictions. The listed jurisdictions were: G20 countries 
(South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia), and OECD countries (Chile, Israel, 
New-Zealand); other significant trading and economic partners of Switzerland (Colombia, United Arab Emirates, Liechtenstein, 
Malaysia); European states and territories with close ties to the EU (Andorra, Greenland, Faroe Islands, Monaco, San Marino); 
34 The list does not include the United Sates. Through the introduction of FATCA, the United States requires offshore banks to send US citizens’ 
tax data to US officials.
35 Including with the 28 EU member countries and, transitionally, Singapore and Hong Kong.
36 Arrêté fédéral concernant le mécanisme de contrôle permettant de garantir la mise en oeuvre conforme à la norme de l’échange automatique 
de renseignements relatifs aux comptes financiers avec les Etats partenaires à partir de 2018/2019 du 6 décembre 2017 (BBI 2018 39). Among 
other requirements, the review criteria included: having an appropriate network of AEOI partners, including the relevant competing financial 
centres; the implementation of standard-compliant confidentiality, data security and data protection arrangements; and safeguards against 
human rights abuses involving the taxpayers under investigation. According to interviews held with key stakeholders, the first requirement has 
become outdated, as all the major financial centres are bound to list all interested countries, in order not to end up on a list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions. If a country meets the AEOI requirements but still does not have an extended AEOI network, it should be considered as a potential 
exchange partner by Switzerland.
37 In other words, Switzerland exchanges data following completion of a two-step process. First, following a consultation process, the Federal 
Council submits the dispatch on the introduction of the AEOI with the new state(s); the Parliament approves the new exchange deal by federal de-
cree; the Federal Council notifies the country to the OECD secretariat. The exchange partner is then “listed” and the AEOI arrangement becomes 
“active”, which means that Swiss institutions will start collecting account details as regards Swiss accounts held by the partner state’s residents. 
Second, before an initial exchange of data, the Federal Council will once again review whether the listed country meets the requirements of the 
AEOI standard, based on the federal decree of 6 December 2017, with a focus on data security and confidentiality.
38 Also applicable for the Åland Islands, the Azores, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, the Canary Islands, Madeira, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, and Saint 
Martin.
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and significant regional and sectoral financial centres, including a few former tax havens (Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Barba-
dos, Belize, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Curaçao, Grenada, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
British Virgin Islands, Mauritius, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadine, Seychelles, Uru-
guay). Six exchange partners39 are non-reciprocal jurisdictions, in the sense that they will supply account information to Switzer-
land but will not receive such data. This second round of exchange deals was internally “activated” on 1 January 2018: Swiss 
institutions have started collecting account details, but the exchange will only take place in 2019, subject to certain conditions. 
The operationalization of the AEOI with the additional 41 jurisdictions is not automatic: it depends on the successful outcome 
of country reviews carried out in advance of the initial exchange, to assess whether the country meets the requirements of the 
AEOI standard on the basis of the federal decree of 6 December 2017. The focus will be on data security and confidentiality. 
In parallel, Switzerland bilaterally activated exchange relationships with two major competing financial centres, namely, Hong 
Kong and Singapore. The two jurisdictions have been assessed standard-compliant. Account information, collected from 1 
January 2018, will be exchanged in 2019. The exchange is transitionally based on bilateral treaties; it will be grounded in the 
MCAA, once the Convention is in force in both countries. 
The Federal Council is proposing to activate the AEOI with eight further jurisdictions on a multilateral basis from 2019 (first 
exchange in 2020; third batch). The new exchange partners are Antigua, Bahamas, Bahrein, Qatar, Kuwait, Nauru, the overseas 
municipalities of The Netherlands (Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, Saba), and Panama. They are all significant financial centres and low 
tax jurisdictions. Six of these prospective AEOI partners exchange information on a non-reciprocal basis (i.e. they will supply, but 
not receive, financial account information). The addition of the overseas municipalities of The Netherlands was intended to fill 
a gap left in the territorial application of the AEOI agreement between Switzerland and the EU. The countries will be listed in 
2019, once the consultation and approbation process is complete in Switzerland; the first exchange of data should take place 
in 2020 with those countries that meet the review criteria. 
Finally, in December 2018, the Federal Council initiated the consultation on the introduction of the AEOI with 18 further states 
and territories (fourth batch): Albania, Azerbaijan, Brunei, Dominica, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macao (China), the Mal-
dives, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Peru, Samoa, Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Vanuatu. These are the 18 partner 
states that are still missing from the 107 states and territories that are currently committed to implementing the AEOI. The 
implementation of the AEOI is planned for 1 January 2020, and the first exchange of data should take place in 2021. Once the 
legal bases for the exchange are set, the exchange will not be automatic: The Federal Council will review whether the newly 
listed countries meet the requirements of the AEOI standard, on the basis of the federal decree of 6 December 2017.
Source: Swiss Federal Council 2017 and 2018; OECD 2018e; Swiss Government, Press release, Bern, 07.12.2018 (https://www.
efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/dokumentation/nsb-news_list.msg-id-73307.html).
2.4 Automatic Exchange of CbC Reports
Switzerland will exchange CbC reports with 57 jurisdictions beginning in 2020 (State Secretariat for In-
ternational Financial Matters 2018a, status as of 21 September 2018). Six of Switzerland’s CbC exchange 
partners will transmit but not receive CbC reports (non-reciprocal exchange partners).40 The vast majority of 
Switzerland’s CbC exchange partners (40 of 57, or 70% of all exchange partners) are developed economies, 
mostly European states and territories. The 17 developing states and territories with whom Switzerland has 
activated the exchange are relatively advanced economies mostly in the high-income and upper middle-
income groups. The only lower-middle-income partners are India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – large economies 
with significant political leverage. No low-income country appears on Switzerland’s list (Annex 3). 
2.5 Summary observations
At present, Switzerland’s EOI network does not comprehensively cover less-developed countries, including 
those whose leading exports to Switzerland include main primary commodities traded via the Swiss hub. 41 
The most vulnerable among them (low-income countries) barely have any legal basis for exchanging infor-
mation with Switzerland in tax matters. They are shut out of the exchange of information. This applies, in 
particular, to the exchange of CbC reports, which could be of particular interest to low-income countries 
when assessing tax risks in commodity trading. The same is observed with regard to the automatic exchange 
of offshore bank account information. 
39 Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Marshall Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands.
40 Non-reciprocal partners are Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Cyprus, and Romania (status as at 21 September 2018).
41 Including zinc, copper, and aluminum (base metals), gold (precious metal), crude oil (energy), cereals, coffee, sugar, cotton, and cocoa (soft 
commodities).
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Table 3: Switzerland’s EOI network: Breakdown of exchange partners by income group (October 2018)
        Breakdown of exchange partners by income group
Exchange  
procedure
Standard-com-
pliant exchange 
relationships (no.)
High-income Upper-middle-
income
Lower-middle-
income
Low-income
EOIR 112 69 (62%) 28 (25%) 13 (12%) 2 (2%)
AEOI CRS 81 61 (75%) 18 (22%) 2 (2%) 0
AEOI CbC 57 42 (74%) 12 (21%) 3 (5%) 0
Source: Annexes 1, 2, and 3. Note: The table only covers standard-compliant EOIR arrangements and CRS AEOI instruments  
approved by Parliament (activated and not yet activated).
This gap cannot be fully explained by lack of political will or interest-driven politics in Switzerland, as dis-
cussed below.
Regarding exchange on request, Switzerland has formally committed to negotiate standard-compliant EOIR 
agreements with all jurisdictions that have expressed interest in it. In this way, Switzerland has taken pro-
active steps to upgrade its remaining noncompliant EOIR instruments, and to expand its network of EOIR 
arrangements (OECD 2016c, 113-14). Further, by ratifying the CoE/OECD CMAAT, Switzerland has assumed 
the obligation to exchange information on request with all present or future CMAAT members. However, 
not all countries were ready or willing to integrate into Switzerland’s exchange network. For example, Mon-
golia informed Switzerland that it was not in a position to exchange information in line with the standard, 
due to limitations in its domestic law; diplomatic contacts could not be established with the competent 
authorities of Gambia and Malawi (OECD 2016c, 113-14).42 The reasons for exclusion – or reluctance to 
join – may have much to do with capacity constraints among potential exchange partners, in light of the 
mutual, reciprocal nature of the EOIR procedure in Swiss and international practice. Switzerland’s EOIR trea-
ties (DTAs, TIEAs, or the MCAAT) are mutual and reciprocal in nature, such that exchange partners must 
have the capacity to collect information for reciprocal exchange. This is only possible if adequate laws and 
regulations are in place regarding the availability, gathering, and transmission of tax information. The costs 
and difficulties of making legislative changes, alongside other pressing reform needs, act as a disincentive 
and deterrent to engagement in tax matters for many capacity-constrained countries. 
Similar considerations arise with respect to automatic exchange procedures, including financial account 
information and CbC reports. As discussed, Switzerland’s AEOI network so far covers significant commer-
cial partners, their dependent territories, and important sectoral or regional financial centres. At the same 
time, Switzerland is gradually opening to “outer circle” countries. Indeed, there is little room for political 
discretion in selecting AEOI partners. The G-20 and OECD have increased political pressure on participating 
jurisdictions to implement the AEOI with all interested appropriate partners: jurisdictions that unnecessarily 
delay implementing the AEOI risk being listed as uncooperative. The Federal Council has thus opened the 
consultation procedure on the remaining states and territories that have committed to the AEOI-standard 
and provided a timeframe for its implementation. This does not mean that Switzerland will “list” all inter-
ested countries: its political commitment is towards countries that meet the AEOI standard requirements. 
This limitation is further strengthened by its review mechanism put in place to assess whether “listed” 
countries meet the AEOI requirements, before any exchange may take place (see Box 5). Likewise, Switzer-
land’s commitments to expand its AEOI network to developing countries still allows it to exclude automatic 
exchange with countries that do to meet the standard requirements. The only commitment taken by Swit-
zerland in this area is to support developing countries in making progress towards implementing the AEOI 
standard. Again, not all developing countries are ready or willing to commit to the automatic exchange, 
whether for political reasons or due to capacity gaps. Some developing countries bilaterally approached 
by Swiss officials have highlighted their inability to meet the automatic exchange standard. They countries 
have expressed the need for technical assistance to securely receive, process, and use tax data, before ini-
tiating any exchange whatsoever.
42 The AEOI with these partners is expected to be activated on 1 January 2020. In order to prevent circumventions of the global AEOI-standard, 
the OECD requires that all participating jurisdictions comply with the international rules on the AEOI.
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Nevertheless, there are viable options to overcome the remaining tax-exchange “impasse” confronting 
many poor countries, as shall be discussed below in the concluding chapter. The “mainstream” policy re-
sponse in this regard is to assist developing countries in setting up the needed legal, administrative, and 
technical infrastructure to exchange such information. Significant support has been mobilized in this direc-
tion, both at the programmatic and operational level. At the programmatic level, the OECD has developed 
a high-level roadmap towards the inclusion of developing countries in the AEOI network (Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 2014).43 At the operational level, technical as-
sistance to implement this roadmap is being delivered via multilateral, regional, and bilateral channels (refer 
to chapter 5). Unlike the AEOI, there is no specific action plan for supporting the integration of developing 
countries in the automatic exchange of CbC reports. However, there are synergies in the two work streams 
(automatic exchange of financial account information and of CbC reports), so that the two can be carried 
out in parallel (Matteotti 2018, 19). 
Questions remain as to the cost-effectiveness – and opportunity costs – of dedicated technical assistance 
efforts to set up the needed AEOI infrastructure in countries that face structural gaps and hurdles. These 
interventions are extremely costly. They may yield lasting results and act as a catalyst, the entry point for 
a far-reaching and sequenced reform of the tax system in poor countries, if implemented in synergy with 
domestic resource mobilization efforts. Or they may be short-lived, suffering the same fate as many other 
forms of legal “transplant”. Indeed, costly efforts to set up legal, operational, and IT infrastructure may not 
result in sustained capacity to operate the exchange infrastructure or to take advantage of the information 
exchanged. Thus, alternative policy options deserve objective, critical scrutiny. These include non-reciproc-
ity, publication of aggregate data, and more transactional forms of assistance, in addition to other policy 
means besides exchange of tax information. These shall be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
43 On 5 August 2014, the Global Forum issued its report to the G20 Development Working Group, outlining a “roadmap” for developing 
country participation in the AEOI (Global Forum 2014). The roadmap proposes a stepped approach to help developing countries integrate into the 
AEOI system. It provides four key principles to assist in the implementation of the common reporting standard for AEOI: a tailor-made approach 
for each jurisdiction; the achievement of domestic synergies with domestic resource mobilization and capacity building; sufficient phase-in time; 
the prioritization of developing countries that are also financial centres.
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3  The Information Exchanged: Can It Help Detect 
 Mispricing in Commodity Trading?
What is the likely role of EOI mechanisms in curbing commodity trade-related IFFs? In particular, do these 
mechanisms provide tax administrators with targeted, useful information for investigation of possible mis-
pricing in commodity trading? Two questions arise: first, what information is relevant to detection of indi-
vidual instances or patterns of mispricing? Second, is such information supplied under current EOI proce-
dures? 
3.1 What information is most relevant?
Assessment of commodity trade-related misinvoicing or transfer mispricing is a fact-intensive, circumstantial 
exercise that rests on transaction data and reliable “comparables”. 
To detect misinvoicing, customs and tax administrations must check the accuracy of the declared value. 
They must determine the correct description, quantity, quality, grade, and specification of the exported 
commodity, and the truth or accuracy of the declared customs value for the exported goods.44 Two sources 
of data and techniques are particularly relevant to investigate false invoicing. First, a valuation database 
may help in testing the accuracy of the declared values, without the need to reassess the actual value of 
each export or import shipment. For comparability analysis, the valuation database may include past data 
of identical or similar exports or imports, transaction data from different ports, airports, and land-route 
customs stations, as well as published commodity price information from authoritative sources (Sewing 
Machine Rehabilitation 2007). Second, data matching – or tracking mismatches in trade documents and 
between trade documents and income tax declarations – may help in establishing cases of value manipula-
tion in cross-border trade. For example, export (sale) documents may be compared with import (purchase) 
documents to investigate mismatches in export and import values. Likewise, customs declarations may 
be cross-checked with commercial, payment, and transport documents (Figure 8), to identify mismatches 
pointing to value manipulation. Finally, customs declarations may be cross-checked with the income tax 
return filed by the buyer in the importing country, in an effort to find discrepancies in values set for customs 
and tax purposes. Indeed, when the purchased inputs are deductible costs in the importing country, the 
purchaser has an incentive to undervalue the transaction with respect to custom duties, value-added taxes, 
and excise taxes, while stating the correct price for income tax purposes. This analysis requires analysis of 
trade documents and the transaction data contained therein, cross-checked with income tax statements. It 
implies rules and procedures for the flow of information between tax and customs units. 
Under the traditional transaction methods,45 transfer-pricing risk assessment and audits require data on 
comparable “uncontrolled” transactions, operating costs, and profit margins (Guj et al. 2017; Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax 2017; Readhead 2016a, 1016b and 2017b; United Nations 2017). With specific refer-
ence to commodity trading as detailed in transfer pricing handbooks (Readhead 2016a, 1016b and 2017b), 
relevant information would include the following: 
-  Key terms of the sale agreement being investigated, including details on price, volume, payment terms, 
quotation period, quality; 
-  Information that helps to identify the trading hub organizational structure and functions, including num-
bers of employees, business lines, allocation of risk, etc.; 
-  Details on the hub operating costs and profit margins, including copies of balance sheets and detailed 
income statements;
-  Information about transactions between the hub and unrelated parties, including pricing policy for differ-
ent minerals and third-party supply contracts held offshore by a related-party marketing hub;
- Publicly quoted price benchmarks and other reference prices that offer a basis for price comparability.
44 It is not the aim here to discuss technical requirements in relation to sampling, analytical testing, and export valuation (on this issue, Read-
head 2018a). The focus here is on the tax-relevant information that can be used to detect mis-declaration leading to export value manipulation.
45 The traditional transaction methods – “comparable uncontrolled price” (CUP) method, “resale minus”, and “cost plus” – are outlined in 
Chapter II of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2017). The CUP method requires trans-
actions between related parties to be priced by reference to comparable transactions between unrelated parties; the resale price and cost-plus 
methods focus on the profit margin of the related entity, compared to those of comparable independent businesses. For a critical overview, see 
Picciotto (2018).
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Figure 8: Relevant trade documents to identify value manipulation
Source: Taxonomy of trade documents of the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT 2002).
As discussed in Readhead (2016a, 1016b and 2017b), the gathered information may help to assess whether 
the sale price between the mine and the trader, as well as potential discounts and mark-ups, obey the 
“arm’s length principle”, which requires that transactions between related parties are priced as if the par-
ties where unrelated.
3.2 Is the Necessary Information Provided by EOI Mechanisms?
Can EOI mechanisms shed light on export misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing? Do they provide tax 
administrations with targeted, useful information for investigation of mispricing in commodity trading? 
The answer is mixed. As discussed below, exchange of information on request, exchange of transfer pric-
ing rulings, and exchange of CbC reports can provide transaction data and ownership information that is 
highly relevant to mispricing investigation. However, automatic exchange of financial account information, 
a key instrument to tackle undeclared personal offshore wealth, does not deliver the type of data – transac-
tional – that matters most when investigating such mispricing. Note also that various operational rules and 
prerequisites preclude the use of EOI mechanisms to tackle mispricing in commodity trading, as discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5.
Documents  exchanged between 
trade partners 
e.g. Enquiry, Offer/Quotation, 
Order, Acknowledgment of 
order/Proforma invoice, Contract
Commercial 
transaction 
documents
Exchanged between trade partners 
and their banks / between banks 
e.g. Commercial Invoices, 
collection payment advice, 
documentary credit applications, 
and applications of bankers' draft 
and bankers' guarantee
Payment 
documents
Documents related to forwarding 
and cargo handling (intermediary 
services), transport, and insurance
e.g. Transport contracts (bills of 
lading, consignment notes), cargo 
freight manifests, freight invoices, 
arrival notices, insurance policies 
and warehouse receipts
Transport and 
services 
documents
Conducted by various official 
bodies for the export, transit and 
import of goods 
e.g. Goods declaration for 
Customs purposes, SPS 
certificates, control and 
inspection certificates, and 
dangerous goods declarations
Official 
controls
39
 The Information Exchanged: Can It Help Detect  Mispricing in Commodity Trading
Box 6: Ownership, bank, and accounting information in tax proceedings
For ease of understanding, it helps to distinguish three types of information that can be exchanged via administrative assistance 
in tax matters: ownership, bank, and accounting information (OECD 2016a and 2016c). These types of information are all rel-
evant to ascertaining and detecting possible instances and patterns of IFFs in the commodity sector. In practice, they intertwine 
in a complex manner, though they may be discussed separately as follows. 
Ownership and identity information involves disclosure requirements to assess chains of ownership and ultimate (beneficial) 
ownership. It uncovers what lies beneath the surface: internal ownership structures of MNEs (parent, subsidiaries, and affili-
ates); and ultimate beneficial owners (individuals, financial institutions, or higher-level funds “above” the parent entity). This 
type of information makes it possible to identify shell companies, trusts, and other similar arrangements with which actors seek 
to circumvent tax obligations based on interposed legal entities. It is a critical component of all anti-money laundering (AML) 
regimes, and an essential ingredient to uncover and expose complex and multi-layered trade fraud schemes. 
Bank information is information held by banks, private bankers, and savings institutions (in Switzerland, the only entities 
authorized to accept deposits from the public on a professional basis, under the supervision of FINMA). Bank/financial account 
information discloses the account holder (and beneficial owner), account balance, interest, and dividends paid or credited to 
the account, and all other income generated with respect to the assets held in the account. It essentially entails two sets of 
record keeping and reporting obligations on banks: customer identity information and transaction information. With respect to 
customer identity information, banks must verify the client’s identity and, for legal persons, the identity of the person estab-
lishing the account and, in some instances, the beneficial owner of the bank account. Bank and ownership information here 
overlap. Transaction information essentially concerns a client’s transaction documents and records. The exchange of non-
resident financial account information, particularly when automatic, has a strong potential to deter (and detect) unrecorded 
offshore accounts and stem tax evasion in the account holders’ country of residence. 
The third type of information concerns accounting information that provides more details on transactions. It concerns the 
obligation to keep and maintain accounting records, including underlying documents (e.g. commercial invoices, delivery notes, 
bank statements, contracts). These “paper trails” are critical to monitor and help tax compliance. In some instances, a double-
accounting paper trail between firms can counteract incentives to misreport. Take the example of value-added taxes, which are 
paid on the value added (sales minus input costs), at each stage. The downstream actor has an incentive to ask for purchase 
receipt, as he/she requires a receipt to deduct input costs from his/her sales receipts. The government could infer from this chain 
of deductions how much the upstream firms earned (Pomeranz 2017). Where this incentive (ask for a receipt) breaks down is 
with regard to the final consumer. Accounting information is also critical, as discussed, to ascertain instances of abusive transfer 
pricing and misinvocing in commodities trading. Note also that detailed transaction-level data furnish the raw data for the com-
pilation of trade statistics: commercial invoices are used by customs authorities for inspection purposes, to assess customs du-
ties, and to compile trade statistics. Some countries, however, require the filing of specific customs invoices for these purposes. 
3.2.1 Exchange on Request
EOIR matters to open the black box of commodity merchanting via trading hubs, including in the specific 
case of related-party transactions. Take the example of a coffee shipment from Laos that is contractually sold 
to a related party in Switzerland, but physically exported elsewhere (transit trade through a related party). A 
broad, standard-compliant EOI mechanism between Laos and Switzerland (currently inexistent) could enable 
Laos authorities to monitor the structure and activities of a Swiss-based trading company that buys and resells 
Laotian coffee. The exchange, as discussed, would in principle cover all “foreseeably relevant” information for 
tax purposes. It could possibly include key terms of the sale agreement being investigated, information on the 
Swiss trader’s resale prices and arrangements, information on transactions between the Swiss company and 
unrelated suppliers, as well as information that could help to identify the trading hub organizational structure 
and functions, including the company’s accounting records/financial statements. The gathered information 
could help to assess whether the trading company performed substantive, value-adding functions that justify 
mark-ups, or if it is just a shell company. It would enable comparison of the price charged in the controlled 
transaction with the price charged in comparable transactions between unrelated parties, after making proper 
adjustments for quality and contractual terms. The exchanged documents could also help to identify the price 
at which the coffee was resold by the Swiss trader. Reduced by an appropriate gross margin and after adjust-
ment for other costs, this price might provide an “arm’s length” price for the original transaction between the 
Laotian company and the Swiss trader. These are only general possibilities – in practice, specific constraints 
may arise from treaty, statutory, and procedural limitations (see below and Chapter 4). 
Exchange on request could also provide information to investigate trade misinvoicing between officially unre-
lated parties. Take the example of a gold shipment from Ghana to Switzerland: pursuant to a standard-com-
pliant EOI clause, Ghana’s tax authority could request from the Swiss tax administration relevant documents 
relating to the purchase, importation, or subsequent sale of the gold (subject to the limits discussed in Chap-
ter 4). Relevant documents might include commercial transaction documents, payment and trade documents, 
as well as official control documents issued by the Swiss authorities. Export (sale) documents could then be 
compared with import (purchase) documents to identify mismatches between export and import values. If so 
provided under the EOI clause, the Ghanaian authorities might also request information on all bank accounts 
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in Switzerland that could be traced back to the gold exporter: bank accounts opened in the exporter’s name, 
or in the beneficial interest of the exporter. The purpose would be to assess whether the parties under investi-
gation deposited the difference between the invoiced and the real price in a bank account to be managed ac-
cording to the exporter’s instructions. However, the information request would only be useful if the beneficial 
owner (i.e. the exporter) were properly identified at the moment of opening the bank account in Switzerland, 
highlighting the importance of customer due diligence requirements by banks in the offshore jurisdiction. 
In this way, exchange of information under a standard-compliant EOI clause could be far-reaching and highly 
relevant to a mispricing investigation. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the admissibility of the information 
request in the buyer’s home state would depend on a number of factors. In particular, the Swiss authorities 
would have to assess whether a valid EOI mechanism is in place; whether the information request concerns 
taxes and persons covered by the EOI clause; whether the request letter is specific enough to identify the tax-
payer and the information holder; and whether the requested information involves commercial information 
constituting a trade secret, in which case the requested authority would decline to supply the information. 
These limitations, discussed at length in Chapter 4, significantly reduce the practical significance of the EOI 
reporting procedure for the purpose of assessing commodity trade mispricing.
3.2.2 Exchange of Tax Rulings and Exchange of CbC Reports
The information contained in CbC reports and transfer pricing rulings can be highly relevant to a transfer pric-
ing risk assessment or audit. CbC reports provide tax administrators with insights into the location of an MNE’s 
income, taxes, and business activities by tax jurisdiction. This overview helps to understand whether profits are 
allocated to the places and economic activities that generate them or whether they are artificially shifted to 
low-tax jurisdictions, pointing to possible misalignments between value creation and taxation. As discussed, 
unilateral cross-border transfer pricing rulings raise specific profit-shifting concerns, as they may have spillover 
effects across tax jurisdictions. By acceding to them, the concerned tax administrations may identify related 
cross-border tax risks and assess taxpayer compliance with local transfer-pricing legislation. Exchange of CbC 
reports and transfer-pricing rulings has potential benefits for developing countries especially. It can equip 
tax administrations in developing countries with vital information on the global operations of an MNE group 
headquartered elsewhere (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, 61-62). 
However, there are limits to the use of these instruments to investigate specific instances and patterns of 
cross-border transfer mispricing. In particular, there are a few built-in limits to the use of CbC reports in trans-
fer pricing investigations and audits. 
First, CbC reports only provide aggregate figures on an MNE’s income, taxes, and business activities by tax 
jurisdiction.46 They do not equip tax administrations with information relating to specific intra-MNE transac-
tions. Under the OECD/BEPS Project, detailed transactional transfer-pricing documentation regarding intra-
company deals is not recorded in the CbC Report, but provided in the “Local File” that is specific to each 
country.47 This means that if, for example, Ghana, wished to have detailed transfer-pricing documentation 
for transactions of entities operating in its jurisdictions, it would need to do so via domestic legislation or ad-
ministrative procedures. Relevant reports would be filed directly with Ghana’s tax administration. The OECD/
BEPS Project provides a template for the Local File (Annex II to Chapter V), but does not mandate its use – i.e. 
countries are free to implement or reject use of the Local File when adopting CbC reporting. Switzerland, for 
example, did not introduce the proposed Local File, arguing that the cost of introducing such transfer-pricing 
documentation requirements would be disproportionate to the benefits (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, at 239). Note 
that even if Switzerland were to introduce the Local File, the information recorded would be intended ex-
clusively for domestic assessment of the transactions of entities operating in Switzerland, and would not be 
subject to exchange. 
Second, CbC reports can only be used for risk-assessment purposes. In particular, “the information [may] not 
be used as a substitute for a detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual transactions” or as “conclusive evi-
dence” of transfer mispricing (OECD 2015c, 49). Nor can local tax administrations propose automatic adjust-
46 Information received by means of the CbC Report can also be used, where appropriate, for economic and statistical analysis (OECD 2015c).
47 The Local File will identify “material related party transactions, the amounts involved in those transactions, and the company’s analysis of 
the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions” (BEPS Action 13 Final Report, at 9).
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ments of the taxable income based on the CbC reported allocation of income, taxes, and business activities by 
tax jurisdiction. These are deemed “inappropriate adjustments” in contravention of the OECD/BEPS standard 
(OECD 2015c, 49). This does not mean, however, that tax administrations would be prevented from using 
the CbC Report data as a basis for a tax audit of an MNE’s transfer-pricing arrangements, possibly resulting in 
appropriate adjustments to the taxable income of related entities operating in the relevant jurisdiction (OECD 
2015c, 49). 
Third, CbC reports only concern related companies and transfer-pricing risks. Independent traders are not 
concerned by the CbC reporting obligations, and CbC reports would not be of assistance in trade misinvoic-
ing, which is usually performed through (officially) unrelated parties. 
Finally, as further discussed in Chapter 5, the recipient country must set up the required legal, administra-
tive, and technical framework to protect confidential CbC reports before the exchange can take place. These 
requirements are highly standardized and stringent, and pose compliance challenges for many developing 
countries. 
Altogether, these conditions limit the operational significance of the automatic exchange of CbC reports for 
the purpose of investigating commodity trade mispricing. As discussed, these built-in limits reflect a carefully 
negotiated balance between transparency concerns, on the one hand, and concerns about taxpayers’ privacy 
rights and the compliance costs for business, on the other hand. These built-in limits will be re-assessed in 
2020, when countries participating in the BEPS project will review the implementation of the CbC reporting 
standard.
3.2.3 Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information
The automatic exchange of financial account information is a key instrument to identify undeclared offshore 
income. The bulk, standardized exchange of non-resident account information is an effective and cost-effi-
cient way to uncover undeclared offshore bank accounts, conceivably on a global scale, with a strong deter-
rent potential. At the same time, the reach of this EOI mechanism is limited in terms of its possible use to 
identify value manipulation in cross-border commodity trading. 
Nevertheless, AEOI between resource-rich developing countries and trading hubs like Switzerland could help 
to identify or deter instances of trade mispricing in a specific type of case: when the proceeds from false 
invoicing are hidden in undeclared offshore bank accounts in the hub jurisdiction. This may occur when the 
exporter and the importer collusively under-invoice the export sale and deposit the difference between the in-
voiced price and the real price into a bank account in Switzerland, to be disbursed according to the exporter’s 
instructions. It may also occur when the difference between the discounted price and the market price serves 
to pay commissions to public officials and the commission is deposited in a bank account opened in Switzer-
land in the beneficial interest of the corrupted official. In such cases, AEOI could uncover these deals, but only 
if the reporting bank could correctly identify the ultimate beneficial owner of the bank account. 
Beyond these instances, automatic exchange of financial account information as currently structured does 
not appear to be a breakthrough in terms of improving transparency in commodity trading. There are several 
reasons for this. As mentioned, the AEOI standard essentially covers standardized bank information concern-
ing the offshore accounts of taxpayers resident in another jurisdiction. It does not specifically concern the 
type of transactional/accounting information that is needed to uncover facts regarding possible instances of 
trade mispricing and abusive transfer pricing in commodity trading. Further, as discussed, stringent technical 
standards and safeguards must be in place before an AEOI relationship is established. This raises implemen-
tation challenges for most commodity-dependent developing countries, many of whom are low- or lower-
middle-income countries with limited administrative capacity, rudimentary data protection laws, and severe 
digital gaps.
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3.3 Summary observations
Exchange of information for tax purpose sheds light on the mechanisms of export under-invoicing and abusive 
transfer pricing. Exchange on request, spontaneous exchange of tax rulings, and exchange of CbC reports 
can in principle provide tax administrations with targeted, useful information for investigating mispricing in 
commodity trading. The automatic exchange of financial account information is not directly relevant, but re-
mains a key tool for detecting undeclared offshore accounts where the proceeds from misinvoicing could be 
hidden. There are, however, a few procedural constraints and built-in limits that can diminish the operational 
significance of EOI mechanisms for the purpose of investigating commodity trade-related IFFs. The reader is 
referred to the next chapter for a more thorough assessment of these limits.
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4  Built-in Limits on Use of Tax Information to Investigate 
Mispricing: The Example of Ghana
Exchange of information in tax matters may provide tax administrations with relevant information to investi-
gate commodity trade-related mispricing (see Chapter 3). However, to assess whether or not possible benefits 
are likely to be realized in practice, it is important to assess a few constraints and “built-in limits” that could 
significantly reduce the operational significance of EOI in investigating commodity trade-related mispricing. 
This is illustrated by way of case scenarios, using the example of Ghana. In May 2014, Switzerland and Ghana 
signed a protocol amending the Switzerland–Ghana DTA (hereafter, DTA Protocol), to harmonize the clause 
on exchange of information with the OECD standard.48 Once in force, the Protocol should enable major infor-
mation exchange between the two countries in relation to taxes on income and capital. In addition, Ghana 
signed the MCAAT in July 2012, which entered into force for Ghana in September 2013. Under the amended 
DTA and the MCAAT, tax authorities in Ghana might in principle access taxpayer-specific information in Swit-
zerland for the purpose of investigating commodity trade-related mispricing. Yet there are several procedural 
requirements that in practice limit this possibility. Key aspects are discussed below. The focus is on exchange 
of information on request, with only limited consideration of other exchange procedures. 
4.1 Specialty Principle
Under the speciality principle, the information exchanged may only be used for the purpose for which it is in-
tended in the exchange agreement. Under the DTA Protocol and the MCAAT, the tax administration in Ghana 
can only seek and use the exchanged information for tax purposes– i.e. to determine, assess, or collect taxes 
on capital; to recover and enforce tax claims; and to investigate or prosecute criminal tax matters. Further, 
the information request should relate to capital and income taxes only (DTA Protocol); the legal bases for 
exchange do not cover customs duties.49 
The tax purpose requirement does not appear to be an obstacle to the use of exchange mechanisms for the 
investigation of transfer mispricing: the request would likely be linked to an income tax investigation. Trade 
misinvoicing, as a form of customs fraud, is a “borderline” case in this respect. As mentioned, the information 
request should relate to capital and income taxes. It cannot directly concern customs duties, or their assess-
ment and collection. This means that a request connected with a misinvoicing investigation is acceptable only 
if firmly grounded in income tax laws. If, instead, the stated purpose of the request is the enforcement of 
customs duties, it would likely be rejected. 
Can the information transmitted to Ghana be used for additional (non-tax) purposes, for example, to combat 
corruption and trade-based money laundering related to commodity transactions? Since 2012, the OECD 
Model Tax Convention provides for such use, under relatively stringent conditions.50 In practical terms, in both 
Ghana and Switzerland, there should be laws and procedures in place that provide for such use. This also in-
cludes internal procedures for the exchange of information between tax authorities and other official domes-
tic agencies (customs agencies, law enforcement agencies, financial intelligence units, etc). Further, under the 
standard, the Swiss unit in charge with the exchange (FTA/SEI) should authorize the use (OECD Commentary 
n. 12.3 to Art. 26 par. 2; Swiss-Ghana amended DTA, Art. 27 par. 2).51 
48 The agreement between Switzerland and Ghana for the prevention of double taxation of income, wealth, and capital gains (hereafter, the 
Swiss–Ghana DTA) was signed on 23 July 2008 in Accra and entered into force on 4 January 2010. In line with the Swiss practice at that time, 
the DTA included a minor information clause, not in line with the OECD standard: Ghana and Switzerland would only exchange the information 
necessary to carry out the provisions of the DTA, strictly in relation to the taxes and persons covered by the DTA.
49 Under the DTA Protocol, the exchange can only concern taxes covered by the Ghana–Switzerland DTA, i.e. taxes on capital and income 
(personal and corporate); the MCAAT excepts customs duties from its material scope.
50 Under the standard, the information received may be used for non-tax purposes if so provided in the domestic laws of both parties to the 
EOI instrument and the tax authority of the requested (supplying) state authorizes such use (OECD Commentary n. 12.3 to Art. 26 par. 2).
51 In its relevant part, the Switzerland–Ghana amended DTA, Art. 27 par. 2 text reads: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, information received 
by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of both States 
and the competent authority of the supplying State authorises such use”.
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4.2 Prohibition of Fishing Expeditions
The requesting authority from Ghana would be subject to stringent requirements as regards the content of 
the request letter, which should be as detailed as possible regarding several issues. So-called fishing expedi-
tions, defined as “random, speculative requests, with no apparent nexus with an on-going tax inquiry or 
investigation” (OECD Commentary 5 ad Art. 26 par. 1 OECD Model Tax Convention), are prohibited. The 
rationale for this prohibition is to “avoid extensive and sometimes unnecessary investigations by the requested 
State”, that would burden the latter with investigation costs (Oberson 2015, 19 and 20).
How specific should an EOI request be? What should be included in the request letter? As specified in the 
DTA Protocol between Ghana and Switzerland (Art. 27 par. 5 subparagraph b. DTA Protocol), and according 
to Swiss practice, the request should specifically identify:
- The person or entity under examination or investigation;
- The identity of the information holder, “to the extent known”;
- The taxes concerned;
- The tax purpose and the domestic grounds for the request;
- The tax period under examination;
- The type of information requested. 
In practice, it could be very difficult to meet these identifying requirements in the context of an examination 
of trade mispricing. Indeed, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing schemes are typically shrouded in 
secrecy, operational opacity, and anonymity. For example, it would scarcely be possible for the tax authority 
in Ghana to know details such as the bank account number of an exporter’s offshore account. Yet, according 
to the rules, authorities must have prior knowledge of the person involved and the tax evasion scheme before 
submitting the information request. In this way, the identifying requirements of the EOIR standard are “similar 
to asking that a fisherman know the name of the fish before catching it” (McIntyre, 2009, in Oberson 2015a). 
Further, it may be difficult to identify the specific legal provisions and taxes at stake in relation to commodity 
trade-related tax avoidance and evasion, owing to limitations in domestic tax laws. This limits the practical rel-
evance of EOI mechanisms to detect or ascertain facts regarding trade mispricing and abusive transfer pricing. 
At the same time, there has been some easing of Swiss practices in terms of the identification requirements. 
In February 2011, Switzerland’s Federal Department of Finance publicly declared that Switzerland would 
interpret all treaties which included a new EOI provision in line with the international standard such that the 
information would also be provided when the taxpayer being investigated was identified by other means than 
name and address, or when the requesting state did not know the name and address of the holder of the 
information (OECD, 2016). In line with this commitment, the amended EOI clause in the DTA between Ghana 
and Switzerland requires the name and address of the information holder “to the extent known” and speci-
fies that the procedural requirement laid down with regard to the specificity of the request letter “are not to 
be interpreted in a way to frustrate effective exchange of information” (Art. 27 par. 5 subparagraph c DTA 
Protocol). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent the identification requirements will be eased in 
practice. 
4.3 Reciprocity
As discussed, Switzerland exchanges information on request on a reciprocal basis, meaning that Ghana would 
need to be prepared to reciprocate the exchange. 
Narrowly interpreted, reciprocity means that Switzerland would not be obliged to provide information that 
Ghana itself could not obtain and exchange with Switzerland under its laws and administrative practices 
(OECD, 2102). This reciprocity requirement has been inferred from the language of Art. 26, para. 3(d) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention (Art. 26) and from the Model TIEA (Art. 7). It reflects in Art. 27 par. 3 subpara-
graph (a) and (b) of the DTA Protocol between Ghana and Switzerland. The requirement could pose significant 
challenges for developing countries that usually lack the tax administrative capacity of developed countries.
Reciprocity poses fewer challenges if interpreted in a broad and flexible manner. It has been observed in this 
respect that “[a]lthough Article 26 imposes reciprocal obligations on the Contracting States, it does not allow 
a developed country to refuse to provide information to a developing country on the ground that the devel-
oping country does not have an administrative capacity comparable to the developed country” (UN Model, 
Commentary n. 1.3 ad Art. 26 UN Model Convention). It has been authoritatively commented that “too rigor-
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ous an application of the principle of reciprocity could frustrate effective exchange of information and that 
reciprocity should be interpreted in a broad and pragmatic manner. Different countries will necessarily have 
different mechanisms for obtaining and providing information. Variations in practices and procedures should 
not be used as a basis for denying a request” (OECD Commentary n. 15 ad Art. 26 OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion). Further, “the principle of reciprocity has no application where the legal system or administrative practice 
of only one country provides for a specific procedure. For instance, a country requested to provide information 
could not point to the absence of a ruling regime in the country requesting information and decline to provide 
information on a ruling it has granted, based on a reciprocity argument” (OECD Commentary n. 15.1 ad Art. 
26 OECD Model Tax Convention).
4.4 Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Under the principle of subsidiarity, the requesting state must first exhaust procedures available under its 
domestic law before submitting a request to the other state (OECD Commentary, n. 9(a) ad Art. 26 OECD 
Model Tax Convention). It means that the tax authority in Ghana should first seek the information at the most 
immediate (local) level, before requesting administrative assistance from Switzerland. The prohibition of any 
“fishing expedition” (Art. 26 par. 1 OECD Model Tax Convention) is also grounded in the principle of subsidi-
arity (OECD Commentary 5 ad Art. 26 par. 1 OECD Model Tax Convention, Oberson 2015a, 19).
The principle of subsidiarity has specific relevance to the investigation of commodity trade mispricing. Note 
in this respect that the information that is most relevant in the context of a mispricing investigation is often 
domestically available in the requesting state. For example, a few trade documents originate from the seller, 
rather than the buyer, and should be sought domestically – e.g. quotations, proforma invoices, and possibly 
transport and insurance documents, depending on the terms of the trade. Other commercial documents (e.g. 
contracts) are common to both the buyer and the seller. Thus, Ghana would be required to pursue all means 
available to obtain desired information in its own territory before approaching the Swiss tax authority. Note, 
however, that the subsidiarity requirement has been applied quite flexibly in Swiss practice. For example, the 
Swiss administration may consider a request concerning trade documents that could be sought locally by the 
requesting party, if the objective is to cross-check the accuracy of the information collected locally. The assess-
ment is often on a case-by-case basis, with due regard for the circumstances of the case (interview reports).
4.5 Internal Laws and Administrative Practices
As mentioned above, the tax authority in Switzerland will not carry out administrative measures at odds with 
Swiss laws or administrative practice (Art. 27 par. 3 subparagraph a. of the Swiss-Ghana DTA Protocol), nor 
will it supply information that is not obtainable under its laws or in the normal course of its administration 
(Art. 27 par. 3 subparagraph a. DTA Protocol). However, the information need not already be in the possession 
of, or readily available to, the tax administration. As detailed in the OECD Model Convention, “[i]nformation 
is deemed to be obtainable in the normal course of administration if it is in the possession of the tax authori-
ties or can be obtained by them in the normal procedure of tax determination, which may include special 
investigations or special examination of the business accounts kept by the taxpayer or other persons, provided 
that the tax authorities would make similar investigations or examinations for their own purposes” (OECD 
Commentary n. 14 ad Art. 26 par. 3 OECD Model Tax Convention) 
Note that the internal laws and administrative practices of Ghana (the hypothetical requesting state) would 
also be relevant (Art. 27 par. 3 b. DTA Protocol). The OECD Commentary reads in this respect: “the requested 
State does not need to go so far as to carry out administrative measures that are not permitted under the 
laws or practice of the requesting State or to supply items of information that are not obtainable under the 
laws or in the normal course of administration of the requesting State” (OECD Commentary n. 15 ad Art. 26 
OECD Model Tax Convention). If this language is interpreted narrowly, Ghana could not take advantage of the 
information system of Switzerland if it were wider than its own system – once again highlighting the question 
of “reciprocity”, as discussed in the same-named section above.
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4.6 Trade Secrets
The Swiss tax authority may refuse to supply information “which would disclose any trade, business, indus-
trial, commercial or professional secret or trade process” (Art. 27 par. 3 subparagraph c. of the DTA Protocol), 
in line with the international standard (OECD Model TIEA, Art. 7, CoE/OECD CMAAT, Art. 21, Art. 26 pr. 3 of 
the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions, OECD 2012).
Trade secrets should be interpreted narrowly, so as to focus on information that might reveal a trade, busi-
ness, or similar secret. For example, they should cover purchase records that reveal the proprietary formula 
used in the manufacture of a product, but not generally a company’s books and transaction records.52 Too 
broad an interpretation would render ineffective the EOI regarding instances of possible trade mispricing or 
abusive transfer pricing. A transfer pricing or misinvoicing risk assessment or audit is a fact-finding exercise 
that builds on commercially sensitive information. A company’s accounting records or trade documents – 
commercial, payment, and transport documents – are indeed commercially sensitive. If they are deemed to be 
coved by trade secrets, there would be no EOI for the purpose of assessing tax risks in relation to commodity 
transactions. 
Notably, to date, there have been no cases in Swiss practice of requests rejected on grounds of trade secrets. 
Trade secrets have been interpreted narrowly so that only sensitive information that might reveal proprietary 
formulas or other protected know-how is covered (interview reports). 
4.7 Stolen Data
Is an information request based on leaked or stolen data acceptable in Switzerland? In the past, Switzerland 
has rejected information requests based on stolen data. This was according to strict interpretation of Art. 
7 of the LAAF,53 which provides that a request will not be considered if founded on information obtained 
through acts punishable under Swiss law. More recently, Switzerland has eased and partly reversed this prac-
tice. On 10 June 2016, the Swiss government adopted the dispatch on amending the LAAF for the attention 
of Parliament. The amendment aims to enable Switzerland to meet information requests based on stolen 
data when the information was received by the requesting jurisdictions via normal administrative channels, 
for example pursuant to an exchange of information from another EOI partner jurisdiction, or from public 
sources (“leaked” data). In July 2018, Switzerland’s highest court authorized information-sharing between 
Switzerland and India as part of a tax evasion investigation, even though the Indian request was based on 
data stolen by a whistle-blower (decision 2C_648/2017 of 17 July 2018). The Federal Court argued that, in 
general, there was no legal issue with use of “leaked” stolen data as the basis for a request, as long as the 
requesting country did not purchase the data. Notably, the information-sharing agreement between India and 
Switzerland did not obligate the requesting party to reveal how it had obtained the information on which its 
request was based.
4.8 Confidentiality and Data Safeguards
Any information received by Ghana’s tax authority in a relevant case would need to be kept confidential (Art 
27 par. 2 Swiss-Ghana DTA Protocol and Art. 22 MCAAT),54 in line with the standard (Art. 8, Model TIEA; 
Art. 22, CoE/OECD CMAAT; Art. 26 par. 2, OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions). Confidentiality must be 
ensured before and during the transmission, and after the information is received (OECD, 2012).
52 This flexible approach to trade secrets in the context of EOI for tax purposes is expressed in the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention, which reads: “[T]rade or business secret is generally understood to mean facts and circumstances that are of considerable economic 
importance and that can be exploited practically and the unauthorised use of which may lead to serious damage (e.g. may lead to severe financial 
hardship)... Financial information, including books and records, does not by its nature constitute a trade, business or other secret. In certain lim-
ited cases, however, the disclosure of financial information might reveal a trade, business or other secret. For instance, a request for information 
on certain purchase records may raise such an issue if the disclosure of such information revealed the proprietary formula used in the manufacture 
of a product […]” (Commentary n. 19.2 ad Art. 26 par. 3 (c), OECD Model Tax Convention).
53 LAAF, SR 651.1.
54 The relevant text of Art. 27, par. 2 of the Swiss-Ghana DTA Protocol reads: “Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting 
State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State […]”.
47
 Built-in Limits on Use of Tax Information to Investigate Mispricing: The Example of Ghana
In principle, what is required in the context of exchange-on-request procedures (Model Tax Convention) is a 
“relative secrecy protection” rule, or “equal treatment obligation” (Oberson 2015, 24): information received 
under the provisions of a tax treaty shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained 
under the domestic laws of the receiving state (OECD 2012; see also Art. 27 par. 2 DTA Protocol and Art. 
22 of the MCAAT). The secrecy standard refers to the internal legislation of the receiving state (Ghana, if a 
request were to stem from Ghana); the standard in the supplying state (e.g. Switzerland) would no longer be 
relevant. This implies that a lighter standard of protection in Ghana relative to Swiss standards would not be 
grounds for Switzerland to refuse furnishing the requested information. Note in this respect that there is no 
uniformity in confidentiality laws and practices across countries: some countries apply stringent confidential-
ity standards, while others have a more open approach based on the principle that the public interest takes 
precedence (Rocha 2016).
In practice, however, EOI between tax authorities “requires that each competent authority be assured that the 
other will treat with proper confidence the information which it obtains in the course of their co-operation 
[…]” (OECD 2012b, 7). Supply of information can be refused, if an “acceptable” level of protection is not 
guaranteed in the requesting state. Reflecting this practice, the MCAAT leaves all doors open: confidentiality 
is based on the domestic law of the receiving state (relative standard), but “in accordance with the safe-
guards which may be specified by the supplying Party as required under its domestic law” (absolute standard) 
(MCAAT, Art. 22). Switzerland could suspend the exchange of information if appropriate safeguards were not 
in place or if there were a breach in confidentiality. 
Confidentiality requirements also apply to Switzerland as the state supplying tax information in response to a 
request. In Switzerland, administrative personnel fulfilling EOI functions are bound to confidentiality. Accord-
ingly, very little information is published regarding requests received. The Federal Tax Administration publishes 
aggregate statistics on the overall number of requests submitted and received (Swiss Federal Tax Administra-
tion 2018); other information is publicly released within the framework of the Global Forum’s peer review. 
No one is entitled to access further data, beyond this information (LAAF art. 22i).55 Confidentiality is also 
maintained towards other official bodies, with the exception of judicial and administrative bodies authorized 
by the Federal Tax Administration, or when disclosure is authorized under Swiss law or an applicable tax treaty 
(LAAF, art. 22).56 These secrecy provisions – as lex specialis – prevail over the general requirement for openness 
and transparency enshrined in the Federal Act on Transparency and Access to Public Government Information, 
which states that all government information is public, subject to the exceptions provided for by law. 
More complex data protection and confidentiality requirements apply in the context of the automatic ex-
change of financial account information and CbC reports, as discussed in Chapter 5.
4.9 Taxpayer’s Procedural Rights
As emphasized in Chapter 1, Switzerland has strong rules and procedures regarding taxpayers’ rights in the 
context of exchange on request and spontaneous exchange of tax information. Under Swiss law (LAAF),57 
the person targeted by the information request as well as all persons entitled to appeal58 must be notified in 
writing, prior to exchange, regarding the nature and extent of information to be transmitted to the request-
ing state. The person in question has the right to inspect the file (in full, including disclosure of details about 
the requesting authority)59 and to appeal (the latter suspending the exchange).60 
55 Loi sur l’assistance administrative fiscale, LAAF, SR 651.1. 
56 LAAF, SR 651.1.
57 LAAF, SR 651.1.
58 Persons entitled to appeal are defined in article 48 of Federal Act of 20 December 1968 on Administrative Procedure (SR 172.021) and include 
persons specifically affected by the decision concerned.
59 The LAAF provides for a right to inspect the file, including the request letter, to the persons entitled to appeal, which includes the person 
concerned by the request (article 15(1) of the LAAF (SR 651.1)).
60 Under Swiss law, the persons concerned by the information request, as well as all other persons with an interest in the EOI have a right to 
appeal. The information will not be exchanged pending resolution of the appeal by the federal Administrative Court (article 19(3) of the LAAF 
(SR 651.1); OECD 2016c, para. 312). The appeal procedure could suspend the information exchange for more than one year. The Swiss authorities 
reviewed appeals during the period under peer review and indicated that a judgment was rendered in the first instance (by the federal Administra-
tive Tribunal) in 213 days on average; the appeal in the second instance (by the federal tribunal) took 100 days on average, in addition to the 213 
days of the first instance judgment (OECD 2016c, para. 258).
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These procedural rights are deeply anchored in Swiss law and practice, and may delay the information ex-
change (in case of suspensive appeal), hinder its effectiveness (when the informed taxpayer conceals the ev-
idence), and deter requests. Notably, any person with a right to appeal can exercise his/her right to see the 
file, including the request letter itself. This letter displays details about the requesting authority and staff, 
and its disclosure could raise the prospect of political pressures and threats of retaliation in fragile countries.
It is important to stress that Switzerland has made exceptions and pragmatically relaxed some of these pro-
cedural safeguards for certain cases. The LAAF61 has been amended to include an exception to prior notifi-
cation in cases where the information request is very urgent in nature or notification is likely to undermine 
the chance of successful investigation by the requesting jurisdiction (Art. 21a of the LAAF).62 The amended 
LAAF also provides for exceptions to the right to inspect the files, if this would impede the ongoing investi-
gation of the person’s tax affairs.63 The exceptions can be more or less broadly applied, and provide a way 
to introduce flexibility in exchange procedures without upsetting the original balance between transparency 
concerns and taxpayer rights. 
4.10 Summary observations
To sum up, there is leeway to use EOIR mechanisms for the purpose of identifying and assessing price ma-
nipulation in relation to commodity transactions. Nevertheless, the operational principles and procedural 
requirements of EOIR can, in practice, frustrate effective exchange of information for such purposes. There 
is a need to flexibly adjust procedures and ease some requirements in order to accommodate developing 
countries. Key issues include:
- Easing of the identification requirements in the request letter;
- Flexible interpretation of trade secrets;
-  Relaxing the requirement that the requesting party be capable of obtaining the same type of information 
under its own laws in similar circumstances (reciprocity);
- Flexible, broad interpretation of information deemed obtainable in the normal course of administration;
- Pragmatic interpretation of the specialty principle;
- Admissibility of requests based on “leaked” data;
-  Relaxing of taxpayer rights via broad application of exceptions to prior-notification rights and the right to 
inspect the file; and ensuring that the details of the requesting unit/person are kept confidential in cases 
of appeal.
In recent years, there has been some relaxation of Switzerland’s procedural requirements regarding EOIR. 
Under peer review pressure from the Global Forum (OECD 2011a, 2015b and 2016c), Switzerland took ac-
tive steps to ease some constraints and hurdles limiting the effectiveness of its EOI on request mechanism. 
As discussed in above, important reforms included the introduction of exceptions to prior notification rules 
and inspection rights, the admissibility of “group requests”, an easing of Swiss practice with regard to sto-
len data, and relaxing of identification requirements in the information request, e.g. the need to specifically 
identify the taxpayer and the information holder. These reforms point to efforts by the Swiss administration 
to advance the transparency agenda while maintaining a balance with competing interests and concerns.64 
61 Loi sur l’assistance administrative fiscale, LAAF (SR 651.1). 
62 Art. 21a of the LAAF (SR 651.1) reads as follows: Exceptionnellement, l’AFC n’informe d’une demande les personnes habilitées à recourir par 
une décision qu’après la transmission des renseignements, lorsque l’autorité requérante établit de manière vraisemblable que l’information préal-
able des personnes habilitées à recourir compromettrait le but de l’assistance administrative et l’aboutissement de son enquête. As reviewed in 
the course of the Peer Review process 2nd phase, “The explanatory note of 16 October 2013 on the modification (message du 16 octobre 2013 sur 
la modification de la loi sur l’assistance administrative en matière fiscale) explains that the first condition (“the administrative assistance would be 
defeated”) can include cases where the prior notification could encourage the person concerned to destroy evidence, and that the second condi-
tion (“the success of its investigation would be thwarted”) can include cases of an urgent nature. When the exception applies, the notification is 
made after the exchange of information, but the law does not set any deadlines to do so” (OECD 2016c, para. 318-19). 
63 Under article 15(2) of the LAAF (SR 651.1), this right can be dispensed “where the requesting party demonstrates grounds for secrecy (des 
motifs vraisemblables) for maintaining the confidentiality of the process or with respect to certain contents of the file” (OECD 2016c, para. 331). 
The explanatory note to the LAAF states: Conformément à l’art. 27 PA, qui s’applique également en l’espèce (cf. art. 5, al. 1), l’AFC peut refuser 
la consultation des pièces si des intérêts publics importants de la Confédération ou des cantons, des intérêts privés importants ou l’intérêt d’une 
enquête non encore close exigent que le secret soit gardé)” (OECD 2016c, para. 331). In the context of the peer-review process, Switzerland has 
clarified that the exception would cover cases “where its EOI partner would not permit the release of the request because, for example, it may 
impede the ongoing investigation of the person’s tax affairs” (OECD 2016c, para. 331).
64 With regard to the need to weigh and balance competing interests, the reader is referred to the concluding observations found in Chapter 1.
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5 Preconditions for Exchange: The Example of Laos
A few developing countries that export primary commodities to or through Switzerland do not have any 
legal basis at all for exchange of tax-relevant information with Switzerland. This is the case with the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. Laos has significant commodity exports to Switzerland. In particular, precious 
stones, gold, and copper are its top three exports to Switzerland. The country may have an interest to seek 
taxpayer-specific information from the Swiss tax authority to identify specific tax risks associated with these 
commodity transactions. Laos may also wish to seek non-taxpayer specific information, including regard-
ing risk-analysis techniques or tax avoidance or evasion schemes, enabling its authorities to gain a better 
understanding of potential tax evasion and avoidance in the sectors concerned. 
What options does Laos have to gain access to tax-relevant information for the purpose of improving trans-
parency in commodity trading? Through diplomatic channels, Laos may express an interest in concluding 
an EOIR agreement with Switzerland that respects the international transparency standard (bilateral chan-
nel). It may submit a request to be invited to sign and ratify the MCAAT, on the basis of which information 
exchange can occur on request, spontaneously, or automatically (multilateral channel). Or it may join the 
Global Forum and publicly declare its political commitment to implementing the AEOI standard. In all cases, 
there are several preconditions to fulfil.
5.1 Bilateral EOIR Negotiations
As discussed, the exchange-on-request procedure is less stringent than the automatic-exchange procedures 
in terms of foundational blocks and underpinnings. Note, however, that Switzerland’s EOIR practice is re-
ciprocal, which means that Laos should have the domestic capacity to collect equivalent information for 
reciprocal exchange. If the reciprocity requirement were interpreted narrowly, Laos would need to put rules 
in place – namely, reporting and due-diligence requirements on companies and financial institutions – to 
ensure that: ownership and identity information, including on beneficial owners, is available for all enti-
ties and arrangements; that reliable accounting records are kept by all relevant entities; and that banking 
information is available for all account holders (OECD 2016a, ToR A.1, A.2, A.3). The tax authority in Laos 
should have the authority to gather and compel the necessary information from information holders. At 
the same time, even if the reciprocity requirement were relaxed, other hurdles would remain. In the event 
of non-reciprocal exchange, Switzerland would still examine Laos’s confidentiality rules and practices as 
regards tax information. If a narrow approach were to prevail, it might require that Laos grant a level of 
secrecy protection comparable to the one conferred under Swiss laws and practices, before any exchange 
would occur (see also Chapter 4).
5.2 Joining MCAAT
On the other hand, adoption of a multilateral approach would not be entirely straightforward either. Laos is 
not a Member of the OECD or the Council of Europe and can become party to the Convention upon invita-
tion only. It could send a request to be invited to the Depository of the Convention – either to the OECD 
or the Council of Europe secretariats. The Depository would then forward Laos’s request to the Parties to 
the Convention. The decision to invite Laos would be made by consensus among the Parties through the 
Coordinating Body. When making their decision, the Parties would consider, among other things, Laos’s 
confidentiality rules and practices and whether the country is already a member of the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (OECD and the Council of Europe). Ensuring 
confidentiality would be “a matter of both the legal framework as well as having systems and procedures in 
place to ensure that the legal framework is respected in practice” (OECD and the Council of Europe n.a.). 
5.3 Activating Automatic Exchange Procedures
Laos has not committed to participate in the automatic exchange of financial account information. If it were 
to consider this route, Laos would need to implement the “foundational steps” to implement the AEOI 
standard (Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 2014, 7-8). 
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First, Laos would be required to translate a host of reporting and due diligence requirements into domestic 
law. As regards the exchange of financial account information, domestic legislation must be in place speci-
fying “the financial institutions that need to report; the accounts they need to report on; the due diligence 
procedures to determine which accounts they need to report; and the information to be reported” (OECD 
2015 b, 10). In particular, there must be in place laws and regulations obliging financial institutions to iden-
tify non-resident accounts, based on documentary evidence of residence (past accounts) or self-certification 
(new accounts); to trace the ultimate beneficial owner, when the account is held by a “passive entity” 
(pass-through approach); and to report a broad range of financial information to the local tax authority. 
Further, there must be in place laws and administrative or judicial procedures that enable the tax authority 
to obtain and provide the requested information. These “information-gathering measures” should allow 
tax authorities to seek and eventually compel information from the person targeted by the request, that is, 
the taxpayer being investigated, as well as from third parties that hold the information, including banks. 
Furthermore, internal administrative assistance and coordination procedures must be in place to enable ex-
change of information between the central tax authorities and other governmental entities, at the national 
and subnational level.
Second, Laos would need to set up administrative procedures and IT infrastructure to safely collect, report, 
process and store the information. The requirement includes “secure transmission channels and protocols, 
through encryption or physical measures or a combination of both”, alongside appropriate operational 
security measures (OECD 2015 b, 28). These requirements are highly standardized and cannot be flexibly 
adjusted to suit local conditions.
Third, the country would undergo a preliminary confidentiality and data safeguard assessment, at both 
the legal and operational level. To be standard-compliant, it should have in place the laws, operational 
procedures, and IT infrastructure as laid down in the AEOI standard. As already discussed (see Chapter 1 
and Chapter 4), the standard is “absolute”: the AEOI standard (OECD 2017a and 2017c) specifies the data 
protection laws, operational procedures, and IT infrastructure that countries are expected to have in place 
before the first exchange. A Global Forum panel of experts, which includes an expert from Switzerland, 
will assess whether standard-compliant confidentiality and data safeguards are in place, give recommenda-
tions, and eventually define an action plan for implementation. Switzerland is entitled to delay, suspend, or 
limit the scope of the exchange with a “listed” jurisdiction until such time as the action plan is successfully 
implemented. 
Finally, there should be a legal basis (a treaty) for the exchange (a DTC/TIEA in place that permits auto-
matic exchange under the standard, or the MCAAT) and, at the administrative level, separate agreements 
between competent authorities of participating jurisdictions to activate and “operationalize” the automatic 
exchange.
If such exchange were activated, Laos could only benefit from the exchange if it had the technical capacity 
to analyze and use large volumes of taxpayer-specific information exchanged in a standardized matter. It 
would need to decrypt and process bulk data and match the decoded data against tax returns declared in 
the country. This requires specialized skill sets, sophisticated IT infrastructure and services, and operational 
procedures. 
5.4 Summary Observations
Stringent requirements – and a host of operational constraints, as discussed in Chapter 4 – limit the par-
ticipation of poor countries in exchange procedures. As discussed, a reciprocal exchange is possible only if 
adequate laws and regulations are in place regarding the availability, gathering, and transmission of infor-
mation. In particular, in order to engage in automatic exchange of information, countries must set up the 
needed legal, administrative, and technical framework for confidentiality, data protection, and proper use 
of information. These requirements are stringent and, in the context of automatic exchange procedures, 
non-negotiable. They pose compliance challenges for many developing countries. A key challenge ahead 
is how to move beyond a “one-size-fits-all” approach and establish operationally relevant EOI mechanisms 
with capacity-constrained countries. Questions also arise about the opportunity costs and cost effectiveness 
of setting up exchange-of-information mechanisms in comparison with alternative policy options. 
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Transparency and exchange of information in tax matters is high on the political agenda, but some major 
challenges must be addressed for the potential benefits to be realized in practice. As discussed, exchange-
of-information mechanisms can provide useful information to investigate trade mispricing, but there are 
significant operational hurdles that tend to inhibit their use for this purpose. Further, reciprocal, automatic 
exchanges are extremely costly, and complex to set up. Countries need to have in place the needed laws, 
procedures, and IT infrastructure to ensure that “as a sending country material can be collected and as a 
receiving country material can be used effectively” (Sadiq and Sawyer 2016, 114). This places an onerous 
administrative burden on developing countries that generally do not have the same level of administrative 
resources, IT infrastructure, or intellectual capital as more advanced economies (Sadiq and Sawyer 2016; 
Monkam, Ibrahim and von Haldenwang 2018). Questions remain as to the cost effectiveness of EOI mecha-
nisms as a means to tackle commodity trade mispricing, when compared with alternative regulatory op-
tions. In Forstater’s words, “transparency as a means to an end suggests that we should consider how best 
to achieve particular objectives, and assess possible approaches” (Forstater 2017, at 5). 
How then to move forward on this agenda item? Some options for action are outlined below. A four-
pronged approach is recommended to improve the effectiveness of exchange mechanisms for tackling 
commodity trade-related IFFs. The recommended approach encompasses: (1) greater flexibility in the use 
of tax information to track down and report on mispricing related to commodity trading; (2) pragmatic, 
targeted relaxation of non-essential procedural requirements; (3) establishment of a legal basis to exchange 
information with lower-income countries; and (4) transactional, phased-in creation of EOI capacity in poor 
countries via peer-to-peer knowledge transfer that pools expertise from different institutional stakehold-
ers in Switzerland. These four areas of intervention are interlocking and should be pursued in parallel. At 
the same time, it is important to explore alternative or complementary approaches that may provide more 
cost-effective means to tackle tax risks associated with commodity trading. In particular, more attention is 
needed to measures and tools specifically geared to counter price manipulation in cross-border transactions. 
Related analysis and efforts should focus on contract transparency and contract allocation procedures, 
valuation rules and techniques, customs cooperation and enforcement, traceability systems, and company 
obligations regarding due diligence. It is also important to consider off-track alternatives, such as simplified 
transfer pricing methods, which deserve further analysis as potential options to counter mispricing.
The present analysis is informed by and builds on previous reports on Swiss policy coherence for develop-
ment in international taxation (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, Matteotti 2018).
6.1 Enabling broader use of tax information
As discussed earlier (Chapter 4), existing rules sometimes allow receiving states to use tax information re-
ceived for non-tax purposes, for example, to track down trade-based money laundering – but only under 
strict conditions. In principle, information transmitted and received may only be used for the purpose for 
which it is intended under the particular exchange agreement (specialty principle); and it shall not be further 
disclosed beyond the tax administration (secrecy rules). 
Narrow application of these rules could prevent use of EOI mechanisms to investigate commodity trade mis-
pricing. For example, under standard exchange clauses, information received by tax administrations could 
not be disclosed further to customs units or other official bodies in the receiving country, if not specifically 
consented to by the sending state (refer to Chapter 4). A narrow interpretation of this rule could prevent 
the flow of information between tax and customs units in the receiving state, ruling out cross-checking 
of tax and customs data – a far-reaching technique used to track down discrepancies in tax and customs 
declarations, as discussed in Chapter 3. A narrow interpretation could also prevent the use of the new data 
generated by EOI procedures for statistical and reporting purposes, beyond those specifically provided for 
in domestic law. Issues of disclosure and proper use of the information, for example, may prevent the tax 
unit in charge of the exchange from passing on the information to statistical and economic units for data 
processing, within and outside the tax administration. Finally, stringent conditions on “appropriate use” 
currently effectively preclude the use of CbC reports to implement simplified transfer-pricing schemes: CbC 
reports are not to be used to make automatic adjustments of taxpayer’s income on the basis of an allocation 
formula (refer to Chapter 4).
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However, there is room to move forward, pragmatically, through minor changes in administrative practices 
and the law. The following aspects are key:
First, the specialty principle should be interpreted in a broad and pragmatic manner. For example, an in-
formation request by Ghana connected with an investigation of trade misinvoicing should be acceptable 
if grounded in income tax laws (covered by the EOI clause in the Swiss–Ghana DTA), even if the ultimate 
purpose is the enforcement of customs duties or exchange controls (beyond the scope of the exchange). 
The Swiss administration could view favourably flows of information between tax and customs units in re-
ceiving partner countries, for purposes of data matching, and generally endorse it as a matter of practice. 
Greater cooperation between tax and customs administrations is indeed critical to track down mispricing, 
particularly in countries that have separate administrations for customs duties and income taxes.
Second, as part of a concerted international initiative, Switzerland could make use of the newly generated 
data for measurement and reporting purposes on behalf of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that 
deal with IFFs. The corresponding multilateral framework provides some openings for such use, by allowing 
the application of information received by means of the CbC Report for economic and statistical analysis 
“where appropriate” (OECD 2015c, section 5, para. 2). Note in this respect that the information generated 
by the exchange procedures can help measure specific dimensions of IFFs. For example, non-resident finan-
cial account data can be used to construct a specific “undeclared offshore assets indicator” (Cobham and 
Janský 2018).65 Likewise, the OECD CbC reporting data may be used to construct an indicator of misaligned 
profits (Cobham and Janský 2018).66 These indicators would not breach any confidentiality requirement, 
since only the aggregate, de-identified information would be released to the public, with the raw data kept 
confidential. There would be no costs beyond those associated with the processing of readily available infor-
mation, since the indicators would leverage the existing exchange procedures. However, there may be trans-
action costs associated with setting up new operational procedures and legal bases: countries may need to 
adopt internal procedures for the transmission of information to statistical departments within and outside 
the tax administration, and may need to agree on confidentiality protocols regarding raw data. They may 
also need to adopt a domestic rule allowing for the use of information for country reporting on the SDGs.
Finally, countries could also consider relaxing the “appropriate use” condition of CbC reporting information 
when the CbC reporting standard is reviewed in 2020. As discussed earlier (see Chapter 3), countries can 
only use CbC reporting information to perform high-level transfer-pricing risk assessment and economic and 
statistical analysis. It is worth considering introducing some flexibility to allow capacity-constrained countries 
to use the data from the CbC reports when making adjustments to taxpayer income on the basis of income 
allocation formulas. This could be part of a strategic shift towards the implementation of simplified transfer-
pricing methods in poor countries that lack the fiscal capacity for sophisticated transfer-pricing risk assess-
ments and audits. In parallel or as an alternative, the CbC reporting template could be amended to include 
detailed transaction-level data that enable tax authorities to perform detailed transfer-pricing analysis.
6.2 Loosening unnecessary constraints
As discussed in Chapter 4, significant operational constraints preclude the use of EOI mechanisms for the 
purpose of tackling commodity trade mispricing. Should Switzerland unilaterally relax the requirements for 
such information exchange, so as to enable more flexible use of exchange instruments when investigating 
commodity trade related IFFs? This might mean cutting back on some operational principles that currently 
“frame” Swiss administrative practice regarding exchange of tax information. Note in this respect that 
Switzerland has already taken active steps to ease some constraints and hurdles that limited the effective-
ness of its exchange-of-information on request mechanism (see Chapter 4). It is also important to con-
sider the political commitments that Switzerland has taken towards curbing commodity trade-related IFFs 
and enhancing domestic resource mobilization in poor countries (Addis Tax Initiative Declaration). These 
commitments can build momentum towards loosening unnecessary requirements. They further emphasize 
transparency aims and enlarge the scope of manoeuvre for future reforms. The key challenge is to relax 
65 Defined as “the excess of the value of citizens” assets declared by participating jurisdictions under the OECD Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS), over the value declared by citizens themselves for tax purposes to their tax authorities” (Cobham and Janský 2018).
66 Calculated as “the total excess profits declared in jurisdictions with a greater share of profits than would be aligned with their share of eco-
nomic activity” (Cobham and Janský 2018).
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these requirements without upsetting the balance between competing interests that Swiss legislation has 
striven for. In order words, the balance can be pushed further towards transparency concerns, but it can-
not be tilted too far away from concerns about taxpayer rights or about a fair allocation of responsibilities 
and costs between requesting and supplying jurisdictions. The proposed changes described below chart a 
possible path forward.
Targeted easing of reciprocity
One suggestion is that Switzerland supply information – automatically or on request – to poor countries on 
a non-reciprocal basis (cf. Meyer-Nandi 2018a and Matteotti 2018). Officially lifting the reciprocity require-
ment would enable information exchange with countries that do not (yet) have the administrative capacity 
to gather and transmit equivalent information on their side. “Targeted” loosening of the reciprocity require-
ment would not be too costly for Switzerland, for several reasons. First, with reference to current practices 
of exchange on request, Switzerland is already supplying information on a de facto non-reciprocal basis: in 
2017, it received 18,164 requests, compared with 18 requests submitted from the Swiss side (Swiss Federal 
Tax Administration 2018). Note also that – even regarding procedures of automatic exchange – the reci-
procity requirement is not written into the law: a change in administrative practice could suffice to loosen 
it enough to accommodate poor countries. It may not even be necessary to eliminate the requirement 
entirely: it could be enough to interpret it pragmatically, for example, taking it as a future-oriented com-
mitment by Switzerland’s exchange partner to engage reciprocally in supplying information when it finally 
has the needed legal, operational, and IT infrastructure in place. Second, a non-reciprocal exchange could 
still require developing countries to have adequate safeguards to ensure confidentially and data protection. 
In this respect, a relaxation of reciprocity need not further erode taxpayers’ privacy rights. Finally, Switzer-
land could opt to lift reciprocity requirements only with a few specific countries, and only for a transitional, 
phase-in period, possibly on a trial basis in the context of technical assistance projects (Meyer-Nandi 2018a). 
It could keep the reciprocity requirements in place for countries of interest to Switzerland as suppliers of 
information, including all treaty hub countries, preferential regime countries, or headquarter countries, 
whatever their development status or income level. 
Spontaneous sharing (or publication) of non-sensitive, de-identified information
Further, Switzerland could consider spontaneously sharing aggregate, de-identified information with its 
developing-country partners, as stated in the Global Forum roadmap (Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 2014, at 20). Switzerland could spontaneously inform Ghana, 
for example, that there are x number of depository accounts held in Switzerland by Ghanaian residents, 
and their overall amount. Given that only anonymous totals would be revealed, no confidentiality rules 
would be breached; and Ghana would not need to have specific domestic confidentiality and data protec-
tion standards in place for the exchange to occur. At the same time, there are two possible hurdles to such 
a course of action. First, Switzerland would still require legal authority to spontaneously share the data. 
In the case of Ghana, the Multilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (ratified by 
both Switzerland and Ghana) could provide sufficient legal bases. However, in other cases (e.g. Laos), there 
would be no legal basis at all to spontaneously share the information. Second, this type of information is 
not already held by the Swiss tax administration: the information must first be collected by financial institu-
tions and then furnished to the Swiss tax authority. This would involve costs for both the financial institu-
tions providing the information and for the Swiss tax administration that verifies and transmits the data to 
other countries. Concerns about competitive costs might also arise if other significant financial centres were 
to forgo such procedures. The core question is whether Switzerland is willing to assume such costs of its 
own accord, particularly in light of its international commitments to enhance domestic resource mobiliza-
tion in poor countries (Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Addis Tax Initiative). In order to limit costs, Switzerland 
might decide to spontaneously share aggregate data with a specific list of developing countries, on a trial 
basis, in the context of targeted technical assistance projects eventually linked to the objective of curbing 
commodity trade-related IFFs. The list might include Switzerland’s focus countries (SDC and SECO lists) that 
have committed to implement the AEOI, but still lack the capacity to meet the AEOI confidentiality and 
data-protection standards. 
Another key question is whether Switzerland should consider publishing aggregate, de-identified informa-
tion about accounts held in Switzerland, as piloted by Australia (Meyer-Nandi 2018a). According to some 
views, such a measure would increase pressure on politicians in countries where political or economic elites 
oppose the introduction of AEOI due to their own exposure to undeclared offshore money (Meyer-Nandi 
2018a). Others question the utility of such public release, as it might threaten the growing policy consensus 
CDE WORKING PAPER 4  I   Curbing Illicit Financial Flows in Commodity Trading: Tax Transparency
54
in favour of AEOI (interview reports). A particularly thorny issue is the publication of CbC reports. These docu-
ments provide insights into companies’ production and sales structure, and may reveal commercially sensitive 
information. Eventually, the question is whether publication efficiently serves the objective of combating tax 
evasion. The issue has already been brought before the French Constitutional Court, which declared the CbC 
publication requirement unconstitutional because it was disproportionate means to the ends, i.e. tracking 
down tax evasion.67 To some extent, there is an unavoidable trade-off involved in greater tax transparency and 
public disclosure: the broader and deeper the administrative exchange of commercially sensitive information, 
the greater the risk for business and the stronger the need for safeguards against abuse.
A pragmatic interpretation of client procedures
With regard to taxpayers’ rights and safeguards (refer to Chapter 4), the Global Forum has recommended 
that Switzerland endorse broad application of exceptions to prior notification, so as to ensure that rights 
and safeguards enshrined in “client procedures” do not unduly prevent or delay effective exchange of infor-
mation (OECD 2016c, 98-106). As regards EOI requests based on stolen data (Chapter 4), Switzerland has 
been advised to exercise flexibility when considering how requesting jurisdictions came to possess particular 
information (ibid.). These are two areas where the balance could be pushed further towards transparency 
by means of moderate changes in administrative practice, without encroaching on key safeguards. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, Switzerland is moving in this direction.
Cutting back on other requirements?
It may be difficult to reduce other requirements, particularly as regards confidentiality and data protection. 
As discussed throughout this report, the confidentiality and data-protection safeguards that are built into 
exchange procedures are key to the normative balance behind the relevant agreements. For example, with 
regard to automatic exchange, erosion of taxpayers’ procedural rights is balanced by stringent confidential-
ity safeguards – laws, operational procedures, and IT infrastructure. If confidentiality and data-protection 
safeguards were eased too much, it could erode and tilt the normative balance too far away from protection 
of taxpayers’ rights – an option not acceptable under Swiss law. The same would be true if changes in law 
and practice enabled more far-reaching use of tax information to track down mispricing, including through 
enhanced cooperation between tax and customs units. Confidentiality and data-protection rules would still 
hold, and possibly even require strengthening. This points to the importance of technical cooperation to 
assist developing countries in meeting confidentiality and data-protection requirements. Some additional 
options for action are outlined below.
6.3 Grassroots Technical Assistance
Developing countries, and low-income countries in particular, require practical capacity building and trans-
fer of know-how and technology to implement EOI standards. Switzerland currently supports and contrib-
utes to related capacity-building efforts by providing tax-related development co-operation to developing 
countries on a bilateral, regional68, and multilateral69 basis. In line with the Global Forum Roadmap, Switzer-
land could “deepen” its cooperation in this issue area by volunteering and testing pioneering EOI practices 
as a partner in a pilot project within the Global Forum, or outside of it in an independent capacity (Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 2014, 22-23; Meyer-Nandi 2018a). 
The focus would be on peer-to-peer, transactional knowledge transfer, including by temporarily sending 
support staff to tax administrations in developing countries. The proposed approach would be modular and 
phased-in: it would aim to assist with medium-term preparative and transitional arrangements that might 
eventually lead to full-fledged EOI mechanisms. Exchange of tax information could be implemented as part 
of training and technical assistance programmes, through operational synergies between cooperation and 
development units and tax authorities. In Switzerland, this would involve strengthened interactions and co-
ordination between the Federal Tax Administration (FTA), the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), 
67 Décision n° 2016-741 DC du 8 décembre 2016, para. 103. See on this point Matteotti 2018.
68 Swiss-sponsored regional instruments and initiatives include the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), the Centro Inter-Americano de 
Administraciones Tributarias (CIAT); the IMF Regional Technical Assistance Centres; and the UNODC Mentor Programme against Money Launder-
ing, Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism.
69 Switzerland supports a few multi-donor programmes providing technical assistance and capacity development in tax matters. These include 
the IMF Revenue Mobilization Trust Fund (RMTF), the IMF Topical Trust Fund on Managing Natural Resource Wealth (TTF MNRW), the IMF Topical 
Trust Fund on Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (TFF AML/CFT), the World Bank Global Tax Programme (GTP), the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and Tax Administration Diagnostic and Assessment Tools.
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the State Secretariat for International Financial Matters (SIF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). A pragmatic approach would involve:
-  Establishment of a framework for operational cooperation between the relevant institutions. This could 
take the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into between key Swiss agencies (FTA, 
SECO, SIF, SDC) and the competent tax authority in the targeted country, for the purpose of rendering 
customized development assistance in fiscal matters; 
-  Promotion of knowledge-sharing regarding the procedural requirements and operational principles that 
underpin and frame EOI in tax matters. This requires an interactive framework, for example, a shared 
knowledge platform, and iterative processes of coaching and practice through regular exchanges and the 
secondment of staff to a developing country tax administration; 
-  Rendering of targeted technical assistance to conduct transfer-pricing risk assessment70 in relation to 
commodity transactions, emphasizing hands-on training and capacity building within the tax authority in 
the beneficiary country;
-  Deployment of technology packages and training to securely transmit data and decode and match re-
ceived data.
The aim would be to satisfy the minimum technical requirements for establishment of functioning EOI, and 
enabling increasing capacity in this highly technical field via a progressive process of coaching and practice. 
In the medium term, this type of intervention could yield more concrete and lasting results than the nego-
tiation of EOI treaties that are likely to remain on paper, leading to little or no implementation in practice. 
In fact, Switzerland is moving in this direction. In particular, the Framework Agreement between the Swiss 
FTA and SECO could provide the “foundation” for Swiss pilot projects on EOI (Meyer-Nandi 2018a). How-
ever, the initiative is still relatively small. The Framework Agreement allows SECO to involve some staff from 
FTA in its development projects in tax matters – something that has occurred in Burkina Faso, for example.71 
The FTA is under significant administrative burden and resource strain to implement the automatic exchange 
procedures. The associated workload inevitably affects the level of engagement that the FTA can offer in 
other areas. Still, the Framework represents a “milestone” that points in the right direction (Mayer 2018), 
favouring institutional convergence and synergies – SECO would draw specific tax expertise from the FTA, 
while the FTA would gain exposure to development issues in tax matters.
Nevertheless, resource constraints and the need to allocate resources effectively and efficiently – also con-
sidering opportunity costs – require careful examination. Many developing countries remain incapable of 
benefitting from EOI, particularly regarding exchange of bulk data. As discussed in Chapter 5, implementing 
the automatic exchange standard in these countries requires long-term, sequenced reform of their tax sys-
tems. This explains some reluctance on the part of the Swiss administration to allocate scarce resources to 
setting up EOI frameworks where the foundations for exchange are missing. A proper sequenced approach 
would require first establishing the administrative and information technology infrastructure of a modern 
tax administration, then negotiating the prospects and terms of information exchange. And, as discussed, 
the level of engagement that the FTA can offer is limited, especially in light of the heavy burden that current 
automatic exchange procedures put on FTA staff.
Alignment of resources, enhanced cooperation, and rational use of available mechanisms are key to over-
come resource constraints. If a particular government submits a request for support with its EOI system, all 
concerned Swiss actors could meet together in order to align and coordinate their possible efforts in this 
area. Depending on the requesting administration’s needs, different options could be discussed, e.g. the 
possibility of launching a new “deep” programme working with ministries and local agencies72 on support-
ing capacity regarding EOI matters, or the use of multilateral or regional funding.
70 This is the direction in which SECO is moving. It has moved from general support on transfer-pricing issues to targeted support geared to as-
sess transfer-pricing risks in specific industries that raise specific transfer-pricing concerns, including the extractive, telecom, and banking sectors. 
71 SECO also has a technical support agreement with Ghana. No activity has taken place yet, due to multiple concurrent donor activities that 
put strain on Ghana’s absorptive capacity.
72 This could be the case for priority or focus countries for either the SDC (e.g. Laos) or SECO (e.g. Ghana).
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6.4 Integrate Poor Countries
As discussed in Chapter 2, Switzerland’s EOI network does not comprehensively cover developing countries 
whose leading exports to Switzerland include the main primary commodities traded through the Swiss hub. 
The most vulnerable among them (low-income countries) barely have any legal basis for exchange of (tax) 
information with Switzerland. A key challenge ahead is to establish operationally relevant EOI mechanisms 
with these countries. The foundational step is establishing a legal basis for the exchange of information 
with these counties. So far, this has been done by means of treaties, by signing standard-compliant DTAs, 
and by establishing TIEAs. In addition, the MCAAT – applicable with respect to Switzerland since 1 January 
2017 – has increased the number of partner countries with which Switzerland can exchange information 
upon request in a standard-compliant manner. Automatic exchanges require separate competent authority 
agreements to activate and “operationalize” the automatic exchange. 
There are a number of options available to Switzerland for integration of poor, capacity-constrained coun-
tries in its exchange network. 
First, Switzerland could favour standalone tax information-exchange arrangements, independent of the 
negotiation of DTAs. Capacity-constrained countries could then exchange information with Switzerland 
based primarily on a TIEA, or by acceding to the MCAAT. Unlike DTAs, TIEAs and the MCAAT establish EOI 
mechanisms without the risk of lock-in of “fiscal policy space” in the source country (e.g. caps on with-
holding taxes or other limits on taxation of capital gains). Under DTAs, poor countries are typically caught 
in a “do-ut-des” situation, whereby they receive limited benefits (information access) in exchange for costly 
concessions like reduced taxation rights over Swiss investments. Thus, by acceding to the MCAAT, Switzer-
land is moving in the right direction from the perspective of low-income countries. 
Second, Switzerland could refrain from introducing excessively restrictive review criteria, beyond standard 
requirements, in its exchange arrangements (Meyer-Nandi 2018a). Worthy of note here is the requirement 
that Switzerland’s exchange partners have an extensive AEOI network in place, including relevant compet-
ing financial centres.73 This requirement has been judged “highly incoherent with Switzerland’s develop-
ment policy” (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, at 68): if other major financial centres opt for a similar restriction, it 
could result in the exclusion of some developing countries (Meyer-Nandi 2018a, 29). By contrast, others see 
the requirement as serving to “counteract a possible circumvention of an AEOI activated with Switzerland”: 
according to this view, it “incentivizes” global uptake of the AEOI standard and contributes to establishing 
a level playing field – a shared concern among the G20 (Matteotti 2018, at 7; OECD 2018b; SIF interview). 
Some interviewees for the present study suggested that the requirement is no longer valid, since Switzer-
land has committed to extending its AEOI network to all interested countries that meet the AEOI standards 
(refer to Chapter 3). Further, in order to prevent circumvention of the global AEOI-standard, the OECD re-
quires that all participating jurisdictions implement the AEOI with all interested countries: by default, most 
countries will have an extensive AEOI network in place. Further, Switzerland is advised not to link exchange-
of-information deals with market-access concessions or other political considerations, as previously raised 
in some dispatches of the Federal Council, since this would not be a standard-compliant practice (cf. Art. 
39 of Act Automatic Exchange).74 
Finally, Switzerland could actively reconsider taking the “unilateral route” to information exchange. In this 
approach, information exchange would be based on a domestic-law provision “operationalized” by MoUs, 
rather than by bilateral exchange treaties. This already occurs in other areas of administrative assistance. For 
example, as discussed in Bürgi and Meyer (2014), FINMA is entitled to transmit non-public information and 
case-related documents to foreign financial market supervisory authorities based on Art. 42 of the Federal 
Law of 22 June 2007 on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority75 and/or Art. 38 of the Federal 
Law of 24 March 1995 via the Stock Exchanges and Securities trading.76 Switzerland extends administra-
tive assistance under these channels if the requesting state promises reciprocal action and confidential 
73 This is one of the review criteria listed in the federal decree of 6 December 2017 (BBI 2018 39), which sets out the review criteria that the 
federal Council should follow before the AEOI can take place (refer to chapter 3).
74 The listing of AEOI exchange partners and access treaties for Swiss financial services to their markets both require approbation by Parliament, 
as jointly regulated under Art. 39 of the Federal Act on the Automatic Exchange of Information (LEAR, SR 653.11).
75 Swiss Financial Market Supervision Act, FINMAG; SR 956.1
76 Stock Exchange Act, SESTA; SR 954.1
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treatment of the data. To operationalize the mutual “commitment”, FINMA has entered into MoUs with 
many countries. According to Bürgi and Meyer, this procedure has operated effectively and could serve as 
an example of simple and reciprocal administrative assistance in tax matters. In October 2014, the Federal 
Council launched the consultation procedure on the Federal Act on the Unilateral Application of the OECD 
Standard on the Exchange of Information (EoISA). Eventually, the Federal Council decided not to pursue 
the project, based on the fact that Switzerland had in the meantime updated and expanded its EOIR treaty 
network, and acceded to the MAACT. Is the unilateral route sought by the EoISA now redundant? In the 
view of the present authors, a domestic law provision may still be relevant, in particular because lower-
income countries still have scarcely any legal basis for exchange of information with Switzerland in tax mat-
ters. A domestic law provision could provide a legal basis for exchange of information with poor countries 
on a trial basis, in the medium-term, in the context of pilot technical assistance projects aimed at building 
the foundational blocks for full-fledged exchange of information. Operationalized using ad hoc MoUs, a 
domestic provision could enable a tailor-made approach to implementation, beyond the “one size fits all” 
solutions of the existing treaty-based EOI standards. A domestic law provision could also enable broader 
use of the information than the applicable exchange instrument, for example on behalf of reporting for the 
SDGs. However, in cases of conflict, international instruments and provisions could take precedence under 
Swiss law.
6.5 Beyond transparency in tax matters?
The analysis above has raised questions as to the cost effectiveness and opportunity costs of EOI as a 
mechanism for countering commodity trade-related IFFs. Indeed, exchange of information in tax matters is 
a complex, indirect tool for tackling commodity trade mispricing, and one that is heavily reliant on adminis-
trative capacity and discretion. It is also a costly endeavour. As discussed earlier (Chapter 5), setting up the 
legal, operational, and IT infrastructure underpinning automatic exchange procedures has significant cost 
implications for low-income countries. Further, these costly efforts may not translate into sustained capacity 
to operate exchange structures or to use the information exchanged. In poor countries, the cost assessment 
should take into account “the urgency of other basic domestic reforms; high costs of information technolo-
gy infrastructure; human resources needs for analysing and using received data efficiently; difficulty of mak-
ing legislative changes; and limited awareness of exchange of information practices” (Global Forum 2014, 
at 12). Exchange-on-request (and spontaneous) procedures are less demanding in terms of requirements in 
comparison with automatic-exchange procedures. However, significant operational constraints inhibit their 
use in investigating commodity trade mispricing (Chapter 4). Ultimately, capacity-constrained countries 
require simple, straightforward solutions that minimize administrative discretion and costs to operate. 
With specific reference to tackling commodity trade mispricing, a number of policy options deserve further 
analysis to understand their legal and technical viability to identify or prevent mispricing. Policy areas that 
deserve further research include the following: “smart” use of benchmark prices for customs valuation 
and other tax purposes; simplified transfer-pricing methods that could reduce the administrative burden 
of detailed transactional analysis; greater use of withholding taxes as a simplified measure to discourage 
base erosion; “smart”, hybrid public–private approaches to improve governments’ oversight of the grade 
and quality of commodity exports; contract transparency, contract allocation procedures, and the possible 
role of blockchain technology in tendering; mixed soft/hard law approaches to “incentivize” and “deepen” 
supply-chain due diligence and reporting by traders and refiners, including by leveraging trade facilitation; 
and new approaches to deescalate international tax competition, with reference to overall low tax rates 
and excessive tax holidays. As discussed in Brugger, Engebretsen, and Waldmeier (forthcoming 2019), 
some of these alternatives – in particular, simplified transfer-pricing methods – have received only scant at-
tention in the literature, and hardly meet with international acceptance.77 The strong political momentum 
toward transparency and exchange of information in tax matters has to some extent pushed further to the 
margin these “off-track” solutions that deviate from “mainstream” (OECD-sponsored) approaches. Further 
research is needed to objectively assess their possible role as interim or systemic measures to counter com-
modity trade mispricing in capacity-constrained countries. 
77 The OECD – the most authoritative standard-setter in international tax matters – does not endorse simplified transfer-pricing methods. Note 
however some attention to alternative methods drawn in other institutional fora (European Commission 2006; IMF 2018; United Nations 2017). 
Refer also to Avi-Yonah 2007; Cobham 2018a and 2018b; Gomes 2018; Grondona 2018; Baistrocchi 2006; BEPS Monitoring Group 2018; Durst 
2010; Langbein 1986; Meyer 2018; Picciotto, 2012 and 2018; Readhead 2017a and 2018; Sheppard 2012 and 2013; Spencer 2012 and 2014.
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Jurisdiction Standard- 
compliant 
EOI with  
Switzerland
Region Income group Development 
status
LDC
Albania Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Algeria No Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Developing –
Andorra Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Anguilla (BOT) Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Antigua and Barbuda (BOT) No Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Argentina Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Armenia No Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Aruba (the Netherlands) Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Australia Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developed –
Austria Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Azerbaijan Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Bahamas Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Bahrain Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
Bangladesh No South Asia Lower middle income Developing x
Barbados Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Belarus No Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Belgium Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Belize Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Bermuda Yes North America High income Developed –
Brazil Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
British Virgin Islands Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Bulgaria Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed –
Cameroon Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Canada Yes North America High income Developed –
Cayman Islands Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Chile Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
China Yes East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
Chinese Taipei Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Colombia Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Cook Islands Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Costa Rica Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Côte d’Ivoire No Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Croatia Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed –
Curaçao Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Cyprus Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Czech Republic Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Denmark Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Dominica No Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Ecuador No Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Egypt No Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Developing –
El Salvador Yes Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Developing –
Estonia Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Faroe Islands Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Finland Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
France Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Gambia No Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Developing x
Georgia Yes Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Germany Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Ghana Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Gibraltar Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Greece Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Greenland Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
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Grenada Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Guatemala Yes Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income Developing –
Guernsey Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Hong Kong, China Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Hungary Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Iceland Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
India Yes South Asia Lower middle income Developing –
Indonesia Yes East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Developing –
Iran No Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Developing –
Ireland Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Isle of Man Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Israel Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developed –
Italy Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Jamaica No Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Japan Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developed –
Jersey Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Kazakhstan Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Korea (South) Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Kosovo No Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Kuwait No Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
Kyrgyzstan No Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Latvia Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Lebanon Yes Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income Developing –
Liechtenstein Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Lithuania Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Luxembourg Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Macedonia No Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Macau Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Malaysia Yes East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
Malawi No Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Developing x
Malta Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developed –
Marshall Islands Yes East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
Mauritius Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Developing –
Mexico Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Moldova Yes Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Monaco Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Mongolia No East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Developing –
Montenegro No Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Montserrat Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Morocco No Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Nauru Yes East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
Netherlands Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
New Zealand Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developed –
Nigeria Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Niue Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Norway Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Oman Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
Pakistan Yes South Asia Lower middle income Developing –
Panama Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Peru Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Philippines No East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Developing –
Poland Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Portugal Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Qatar Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
Romania Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed –
Russia Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Saint Kitts and Nevis Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Saint Lucia Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Saint Vincent and the  
Grenadines
Yes Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
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Samoa Yes East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
San Marino Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Saudi Arabia Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
Senegal Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Developing x
Serbia No Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Seychelles Yes Sub-Saharan Africa High income Developing –
Singapore Yes East Asia & Pacific High income Developing –
Sint Maarten Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Slovak Republic Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Slovenia Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
South Africa Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Developing –
Spain Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Sri Lanka No South Asia Lower middle income Developing –
Sweden Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
Tajikistan No Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Thailand No East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing –
Trinidad and Tobago No Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Tunisia Yes Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income Developing –
Turkey Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developing –
Turkmenistan Yes Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Transition –
Turks and Caicos Islands Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Uganda Yes Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Developing x
Ukraine Yes Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
United Arab Emirates Yes Middle East & North Africa High income Developing –
United Kingdom Yes Europe & Central Asia High income Developed –
United States No North America High income Developed –
Uruguay Yes Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing –
Uzbekistan Yes Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income Transition –
Venezuela No Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing –
Viet Nam No East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Developing –
Zambia No Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Developing x
Sources and metadata: 
The list of standard compliant exchange of information mechanisms was based on the Annex 2 list to Switzerland’s peer review 
report - phase 2 (OECD 2016c). The list was updated based on the SIF list of Switzerland’s DTA/TIEA (State Secretariat for Interna-
tional Financial Matters 2018b, retrieved on 02/10/2018, status as of 20 August 2018) and the list of jurisdictions for which the 
MCAAT is in force (MCAAT 2018, retrieved on 2 October 2018, status as of 24 September 2018). The information was cross-
checked with the OECD EOIR database (OECD 2018g). 
Income status according to World Bank Country and Lending Groups, current classification by income for the 2017 fiscal year. 
Economic indicators for non-state jurisdictions from UNData, http://data.un.org/Default.aspx. Geographical groups and composition 
according to World Bank list of economies (June 2017). LDC status according to the official UN list of LDCs, as of 31 October 2018. 
Development status as per UNCTADStat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCountries_DevelopmentStatus_Hier-
archy.pdf ).
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Annex 2: AEOI relationships (financial account) approved by the Swiss Parliament 
(cut-of date 2 October 2018)
Partner state Note Entry into 
force
First  
exchange)
Legal basis Region Income group Development 
statuts
Andorra  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Antigua and 
 Barbuda
1 - - CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Argentina  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Aruba 1 - - CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Australia  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developed
Austria  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Barbados  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Belgium  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Belize 1 01.01.2018 - CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Bermuda 2 01.01.2018  CRS MCAA North America High income Developed
Brazil  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
British Virgin 
Islands
2 01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Bulgaria  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
Upper middle 
income
Developed
Canada  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA North America High income Developed
Cayman Islands 2 01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Chile  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
China  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Colombia  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Cook Islands 1 01.01.2018 - CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developing
Costa Rica 1 01.01.2018 - CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Croatia  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
Upper middle 
income
Developed
Curaçao 1 01.01.2018 – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Cyprus  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Czech Republic  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Denmark  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Estonia  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Faroe Islands  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Finland  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
France  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Germany  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Gibraltar  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Greece  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
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Greenland  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Grenada 1 – – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Guernsey  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Hong Kong  01.01.2018  Bilateral Treaty East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developing
Hungary  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Iceland  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
India  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA South Asia Lower middle 
income
Developing
Indonesia  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
Lower middle 
income
Developing
Ireland  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Isle of Man  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Israel  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Middle East & 
North Africa
High income Developed
Italy  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Japan  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developed
Jersey  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Latvia  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Liechtenstein  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Lithuania  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Luxembourg  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Malaysia  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Malta  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Middle East & 
North Africa
High income Developed
Marshall Islands 1; 2 – – CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Mauritius  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Mexico  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Monaco  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Montserrat 1 01.01.2018 – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Netherlands  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
New Zealand  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developed
Norway  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Poland  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Portugal  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Romania  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
Upper middle 
income
Developed
Russia  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
Upper middle 
income
Developed
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis
1 01.01.2018 – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
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Saint Lucia 1 01.01.2018 – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines
1 01.01.2018 – CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
Upper middle 
income
Developing
San Marino  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Saudi Arabia  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Middle East & 
North Africa
High income Developing
Seychelles  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Sub-Saharan 
Africa
High income Developing
Singapore  01.01.2018  Bilateral Treaty East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developing
Slovak Republic  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Slovenia  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
South Africa  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Upper middle 
income
Developing
South Korea  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 CRS MCAA East Asia & 
Pacific
High income Developing
Spain  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Sweden  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Turks and Caicos 
Islands
2 01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
United Arab Emir-
ates
2 01.01.2019  CRS MCAA Middle East & 
North Africa
High income Developing
United Kingdom  01.01.2017 01.01.2018 EU Agreement Europe & Central 
Asia
High income Developed
Uruguay  01.01.2018  CRS MCAA Latin America & 
Caribbean
High income Developing
Sources and metadata: 
Swiss Federal Council 2016, 2017 and 2018; State Secretariat for International Financial Matters 2018c (List of bilateral AEOI 
relationships), retrieved on 2 October 2018, updated to 11 September 2018. 
Income status according to World Bank Country and Lending Groups, current classification by income for the 2017 fiscal year. 
Economic indicators for non-state jurisdictions from UNData, http://data.un.org/Default.aspx. Geographical groups and composi-
tion according to World Bank list of economies (June 2017). 
Development status as per UNCTADStat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCountries_DevelopmentStatus_Hier-
archy.pdf ).
Notes: The list only includes exchange relationships approved by Parliament as of 2 October 2018. Entry into force on 1 January 
2017 means that financial institutions started collecting data on 1 January 2017 and to exchange data in 2018; entry into force 
on 1 January 2018 means that FIs started collecting data in 2018 for exchange in 2019. Note 1: Implementation postponed (the 
country must implement a Global Forum action plan on confidentiality and data security). Note 2: The exchange partner supplies 
but does not receive information (non-reciprocal jurisdiction). 
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Partner Note Legal basis Region Income group Development 
status
Argentina  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing
Australia  CRS MCAA East Asia & Pacific High income Developed
Austria  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Belgium  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Bermuda 1 CRS MCAA North America High income Developed
Brazil  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing
Bulgaria  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed
Canada  CRS MCAA North America High income Developed
Cayman Islands 1 CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing
Chile  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing
Colombia  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing
Costa Rica 1 CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing
Croatia  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed
Curaçao 1 CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing
Cyprus 1 EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Czech Republic  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Denmark  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Estonia  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Finland  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
France  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Germany  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Greece  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Guernsey  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Hungary  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Iceland  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
India  CRS MCAA South Asia Lower middle income Developing
Indonesia  CRS MCAA East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income Developing
Ireland  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Isle of Man  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Italy  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Japan  CRS MCAA East Asia & Pacific High income Developed
Jersey  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Korea (South)   East Asia & Pacific High income Developing
Latvia  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Liechtenstein  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Lithuania  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Luxembourg  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Malaysia  CRS MCAA East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income Developing
Malta  EU Agreement Middle East & North Africa High income Developed
Mauritius  CRS MCAA Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Developing
Mexico  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income Developing
Netherlands  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
New Zealand  CRS MCAA East Asia & Pacific High income Developed
Norway  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Pakistan   South Asia Lower middle income Developing
Poland  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Portugal  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Romania 1 EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed
Russia  CRS MCAA Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income Developed
Singapore  Bilateral Treaty East Asia & Pacific High income Developing
Slovak Republic  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Slovenia  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
South Africa  CRS MCAA Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Developing
CDE WORKING PAPER 4  I   Curbing Illicit Financial Flows in Commodity Trading: Tax Transparency
72
Spain  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Sweden  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
United Kingdom  EU Agreement Europe & Central Asia High income Developed
Uruguay  CRS MCAA Latin America & Caribbean High income Developing
Sources and metadata: 
State Secretariat for International Financial Matters 2018a (list of Switzerland’s CbCR exchange relationships, status as at 21 Sep-
tember 2018), OECD 2018g (“Country-by-Country Exchange Relationships Database”, September 2018) and MCAAT 2018.
Income status according to World Bank Country and Lending Groups, current classification by income for the 2017 fiscal year. 
Economic indicators for non-state jurisdictions from UNData, http://data.un.org/Default.aspx. Geographical groups and composi-
tion according to World Bank list of economies (June 2017). 
Development status as per UNCTADStat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCountries_DevelopmentStatus_Hier-
archy.pdf ).
Notes:  1: Non-reciprocal partners (will only transmit but not receive CbC reports).
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Dt Fr It En (non official  
language)
SR/BBI no.
EOIR and 
spontaneous 
exchange
Bundesgesetz vom 28. 
September 2012 über 
die internationale Amt-
shilfe in Steuersachen 
(Steueramtshilfegesetz, 
StAhiG)
Loi fédérale du 28 
septembre 2012 sur 
l’assistance administra-
tive internationale en 
matière fiscale (Loi sur 
l’assistance administra-
tive fiscale, LAAF)
Legge federale del 
28 settembre 2012 
sull’assistenza ammin-
istrativa internazionale 
in materia fiscale (Legge 
sull’assistenza amminis-
trativa fiscale, LAAF)
Federal Act of 28 Sep-
tember 2012 on Internal 
Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters
SR 651.1
EOIR and 
spontaneous 
exchange
Verordnung vom 23. 
November 2016 über 
die internationale Amt-
shilfe in Steuersachen 
(Steueramtshilfeverord-
nung, StAhiV)
Ordonnance du 23 
novembre 2016 sur 
l’assistance administra-
tive internationale en 
matière fiscale (Ordon-
nance sur l’assistance 
administrative fiscale, 
OAAF)
Ordinanza del 23 
novembre 2016 
sull’assistenza ammin-
istrativa internazionale 
in materia fiscale (Or-
dinanza sull’assistenza 
amministrativa fiscale, 
OAAF)
Ordinance of 23 
November 2016 on 
Internal Administra-
tive Assistance in Tax 
Matters
SR 651.11
AEOI CRS Bundesgesetz vom 18. 
Dezember 2015 über 
den internationalen 
automatischen Infor-
mationsaustausch in 
Steuersachen (AIAG)
Loi fédérale du 18 
décembre 2015 sur 
l’échange international 
automatique de rensei-
gnements en matière 
fiscale (LEAR)
Legge federale del 18 
dicembre 2015 sullo 
scambio automatico 
internazionale di in-
formazioni a fini fiscali 
(LSAI)
Federal Act on the 
Automatic Exchange of 
Information (AEOI Act)
SR 653.1
AEOI CRS Verordnung vom 23. 
November 2016 über 
den internationalen 
automatischen Infor-
mationsaustausch in 
Steuersachen (AIAV)
Ordonnance du 23 
novembre 2016 sur 
l’échange international 
automatique de rensei-
gnements en matière 
fiscale (OEAR)
Ordinanza del 23 
novembre 2016 sullo 
scambio automatico 
internazionale di in-
formazioni a fini fiscali 
(OSAIn)
Automatic Exchange of 
Information Ordinance 
(AEOI Ordinance)
SR 653.11
AEOI CRS Wegleitung: Standard 
für den automatischen 
Infor-mationsaustausch 
über Finanzkonten Ge-
meinsamer Meldestand-
ard (Bern, 17. Januar 
2017)
Directive : Norme 
d'échange automatique 
de renseignements 
relatifs aux comptes 
financiers Norme com-
mune de déclaration 
(Berne, 17 janvier 2017)
Direttiva Standard per lo 
scambio automatico di 
informazioni relative a 
conti finanziari Standard 
comune di comunica-
zione di informazioni 
(Berna, 17 gennaio 
2017)
AEOI Guidelines
AEOI CRS Technische Wegleitung: 
Standard für den au-
tomatischen Informa-
tionsaustausch über 
Finanzkonten (Bern, 
September 2017)
Directive technique :
Norme d’échange 
automatique de 
renseignements relatifs 
aux comptes financi-
ers (Berne, septembre 
2017)
Direttiva tecnica: Stand-
ard per lo scambio auto-
matico di informazioni 
relative a conti finanziari 
(Berna, settembre 2017)
AEOI Technical Guide-
lines
AEOI CRS Bundesbeschluss über 
den Prüfmechanismus 
zur Sicherstellung 
der standardkonfor-
men Umsetzung 
des automatischen 
Informationsaustauschs 
über Finanzkonten 
mit Partnerstaaten ab 
2018/2019 (BBI 2018 
39)
Arrêté fédéral
concernant le mé-
canisme de contrôle 
permettant de garantir 
la mise
en oeuvre conforme à 
la norme de l’échange 
automatique
de renseignements 
relatifs aux comptes 
financiers avec les Etats
partenaires à partir de 
2018/2019 du 6 décem-
bre 2017 (FF 2018 39)
Decreto federale
concernente il meccan-
ismo di verifica che gar-
antisce un’attuazione
conforme allo standard 
dello scambio automa-
tico di informazioni
relative a conti finanziari 
con gli Stati partner dal 
2018/2019 del 6 dicem-
bre 2017 (FF 2018 41)
BBI 2018 39
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AEOI CRS Botschaft
zur Genehmigung der 
multilateralen Verein-
barung
der zuständigen 
Behörden über den 
automatischen
Informationsaustausch 
über Finanzkonten und 
zu ihrer Umsetzung
(Bundesgesetz über den 
internationalen automa-
tischen
Informationsaustausch 
in Steuersachen)
vom 5. Juni 2015 (BBI 
2015 5437)
Message
relatif à l’approbation 
de l’accord multilatéral 
entre autorités
compétentes concer-
nant l’échange automa-
tique de renseignements
relatifs aux comptes 
financiers et à sa mise 
en oeuvre
(Loi fédérale sur 
l’échange international 
automatique de
renseignements en mat-
ière fiscale, loi EAR)
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Switzerland’s central role in commodity trading brings with it leverage and responsibilities. The Swiss commodity 
trading industry – and its regulatory environment – has come under increasing scrutiny as a possible conduit for illicit 
financial flows (IFFs) out of resource-rich developing countries. Against this background, Switzerland has committed 
to improving tax and trade transparency and curbing commodity trade-related IFFs. One specific dimension of this 
concerns illicit flows associated with false invoicing and manipulative transfer pricing. The broad underlying issue is 
aggressive tax avoidance, if not outright tax evasion, often entangled with money laundering and corruption.
Exchange of tax information can shed light on illicit financial flows associated with trade misinvoicing and abusive 
transfer pricing. Exchange on request, spontaneous exchange of tax rulings, and exchange of country-by-country 
reports can in principle provide tax administrators with useful information for investigation of possible mispricing 
practices. The automatic exchange of financial account information (AEOI) is not directly relevant, but remains a key 
tool for detecting undeclared offshore wealth where the proceeds from mispricing may end up. There are, however, 
a few procedural constraints and built-in limits that constrain the use of exchange-of-information mechanisms for 
investigating commodity trade mispricing. This report addresses these questions with reference to Switzerland’s legal 
framework and practice in relation to exchange of information for tax purposes. 
The report calls for a four-pronged approach to improve the effectiveness of exchange mechanisms to tackle commod-
ity trade-related illicit financial flows, encompassing: (1) more flexibility to use tax information for tracking down trade 
mispricing; (2) a pragmatic, targeted relaxation of procedural requirements; (3) the establishment of a legal basis to 
exchange information with lower-income countries; (4) a transactional, phased-in approach to enhance administra-
tive capacity in poor countries via peer-to-peer knowledge transfer that pools expertise from different institutional 
stakeholders in Switzerland. The report also raises questions as to the cost-effectiveness of exchange of information in 
tax matters as a means to tackle commodity trade mispricing, Attention is directed to alternative measures and tools 
specifically geared to counter value manipulation in cross-border transactions, including “off-track” solutions that may 
cut incentives to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions.
